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Abstract 
 
This honors thesis examines the evolution of the state and nation-building processes in 
four historical periods in Ethiopia. I argue that, in the generational efforts towards 
consolidation and change, each period throws up acute tensions between an increasingly 
centralizing political apparatus and the civic and material existence of ethnic peripheries. 
These contradictions are apparent in the attempts to secure the country's territorial 
sovereignty under Menelik II, the efforts towards modernization by Emperor Haile 
Selassie, the militaristic-cum-Marxist drive under Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, and the 
construction of a developmental state under the leadership of Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi. While some achievements could be discerned in each period, all of them raise 
questions about legitimacy and competence—two factors that are indispensable for the 
ultimate success of a state in managing its own vulnerabilities and the fate of its society. 
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“The Amharas and Tigrayans have their history, whereas other people have their 
anthropology” — Christopher Clapham 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
I. The challenge 
 
The nation-state is the most well established form of political organization in the 
contemporary international order. For the majority of African states, conforming to the 
nation-state structure continues to pose many challenges. The vast majority of African 
states are artificial colonial constructs in that their boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by 
colonial powers in ways that led to what Benjamin Miller (2007) calls the “nation-state 
imbalance.” Only in a few cases does the territory of a nation overlap with the political 
boundary of the state. At the time of independence, African leaders adopted this model in 
conformity with European states. This forced the collective lives of people to be told in 
one historical narrative, providing limited space for the expression of multiculturalism 
and a negotiated space for diversity and difference. 
Both the colonized and the non-colonized worlds are faced with the challenge and 
task of building a viable and capable state. The state is also tasked with creating a 
meaningful citizenship that imagines a national identity into being. While the state and 
state-like institutions hold agency in moving a society forward, it is critical to note the 
constraints faced by the state itself. In the current era of neoliberalism, post-independence 
Africa faces endogenous and exogenous political and economic forces that undermine the 
role of the state and cripple its capacity for reform and development. 
The challenges of the African state, particularly that of Ethiopia, spur my 
intellectual curiosity and encourage me to investigate the state-building and nation-
building processes to better understand the political and economic dynamics of the 
present times. I hope to investigate Ethiopia’s past shortcomings and potential assets for 
the building of a just, multi-ethnic state. From the beginning, the creation of the 
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Ethiopian nation-state was a project of establishing a dominant Amhara identity, 
relegating other communities to the periphery. This undermined the political and social 
structures of indigenous societies and created little to no viable space to accommodate 
and honor difference. Within the boundaries of the state, the rise of capitalist forms of 
accumulation and class formation further intensified the problem and politicized ethnic 
differences. The adoption of Ethiopia's current ethnic federalism system is a response to 
the shortcomings of Ethiopia’s historical and political past—a past constructed on 
identity politics, policies of destructive homogenization, and economic injustice. The 
proposition of establishing a federalist state is still under great debate; not the least is the 
central question of whether the new design overcomes the destructive effect of past 
homogenization. For the Oromos and other marginalized ethnic groups, the question of 
national identity remains one that is heavily contested. 
II. Research Questions 	
Central questions I wish to engage in this thesis project are: What endogenous and 
exogenous forces guided the formation of the Ethiopian state?  How does one 
characterize Ethiopia’s process of state-building and nation-building? I wish to focus my 
analysis of the state during four dominant historical periods: Menelik II (1889-1913), 
Emperor Haile Selassie (1931-1974), Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974-1991) and Meles 
Zenawi (1991-2012). Engaging the broader question of my topic’s importance and 
positioning it in regional perspectives, I seek to find the lessons Ethiopia offers to the 
Horn of Africa and beyond on the issues of historical inheritance and ethnic politics. 
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III. Motivation 
 
“History is about ideas, specifically the conflict of ideas and how those conflicts played 
out in earlier times and what they can tell us about today.”—Robert Freeman 
 
 There are three reasons that contributed to my decision to do an honors thesis. 
First, through this academic pursuit, I wish to understand Ethiopia’s past and develop my 
own critical thoughts when evaluating the future direction of Ethiopia. Second, the 
opportunity to study my own society with rigor would grant me the opportunity to engage 
with contemporary challenges of the Ethiopian state from a place of critical knowledge. 
Such an understanding will include an exploration of the threads of counter-histories that 
contradict the national narrative and shed light on the geopolitical realities that impact 
state formation and development. Here, I will particularly aim to shed light on the 
development of capitalism, class formation and the continuous struggle over material life 
that has now become intimately linked with the politics of ethnicity in Ethiopia.  
Thirdly, I am pursuing an honors thesis to better understand dominant paradigms 
or ideas. The distinct historical periods in Ethiopia were associated with certain 
ideologies that further shaped the direction of the state and state-society relations. While 
some of these paradigms remain and further materialize in the next historical period, 
other ideas were fought off or uprooted for the making of a new order. This struggle over 
ideas and their material consequences is one that is not unique to Ethiopia; the very 
challenges faced by Ethiopia also speak to some of the problems confronting other 
developing countries. Thus, I wish that the knowledge I gain through this work will give 
me greater capacity to engage other societies and the complex histories and identities 
people inhabit.  
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Fourth, this academic work will allow me to facilitate my own agency as a civic-
minded individual in an international setting. One of the greatest pitfalls of the Ethiopian 
diaspora is the lack of knowledge. By knowledge, I mean an understanding of the nature 
of the past that allows for deeper evaluation of the contemporary dominant power 
structures of the age—of which Ethiopia is a part. Whether engagement takes the form of 
education, advocacy or a specific project on the ground or amongst the diaspora, I want 
my future action and means of civic living to be informed by critical scholarship.  
Fifth, through undertaking this honors thesis, I also seek to grow personally. 
During my time at Macalester College, I have begun to critically question what it means 
to be an “Ethiopian.” I recall many contradictory experiences of identity. Questions such 
as “Are you Habesha?” or “Where are you from?,” as simple as they might appear, have 
brought me to reflect on the problematic nature of political boundaries that guide identity 
formation. I now realize that these questions are embedded in larger economic and 
political processes that characterize the development of the Ethiopian state itself. 
Furthermore, stories of the Oromo diaspora serve as the greatest personal impetus toward 
this research. These narratives are full of many wounded contradictions. Memories of the 
diaspora reflect the realities of ethnic marginalization and the imperatives for a national, 
Ethiopian identity. Experiences of displacement both at home and abroad have left 
historical grievances that have not been properly dealt with. Whether it is at sacred sites 
of worship or social gatherings, ethnicity has become a vehicle of division and 
segregation. How does one confront the political past? What does unity in the midst of 
diversity mean? I bring these subjective inquiries into my paper for reflection.  
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IV. Sources and Methodology  
 
In gathering information for my project, I will mostly rely on scholarly books and 
articles. Although there are many important historical works on Ethiopia, there are few 
studies that have theorized the state-formation and nation-building processes in the 
country. Taking note of this gap in the literature, I follow the footsteps of historian John 
Markakis to theorize the development of Ethiopia’s state-apparatus over time. In 
particular, I will stress the value of Charles Tilly’s “predatory theory” to explain the 
making of the state in the first three historical periods. The Ethiopian state under Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi, although still showing some predatory tendencies, exemplifies 
the characteristics of a developmentalist aspiration. I hope for my learning of history and 
theorization to be guided by “historical understanding.” By this, I mean scholarly insight 
and evidence and employing both distance and intersubjective intimacy in my analysis. 
Finally, this is my first intellectual engagement with such a daunting topic. Consequently, 
I will strive to be epistemologically modest.  
V. Preparation   
 
There are both academic and personal experiences that have prepared me to 
undertake an honors project. Through the course, Power and Development in Africa, I 
was exposed to important concepts and a way of understanding the struggle for 
development based on the interplay between structure and agency. Another class that has 
prepared me for this work is Global Political Economy. Through this class, I was 
introduced to one of the pivotal works of Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. 
Polanyi highlights the performative nature of capitalism, what he refers to as the liberal 
creed, both on human individuals and the natural environment. Understanding the 
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processes of early capitalist formation and its intimate links to the underdevelopment of 
peripheralized countries has given me important insights to build upon when evaluating 
state development in Ethiopia. Furthermore, these insights allow me to situate Ethiopia 
within the larger international political and economic context. The class, Paradigms of 
Global Leadership, has drawn my attention to the importance of leadership and the place 
of both reformist and revolutionary leaders in the course of history. 
My study abroad experience in the Netherlands has contributed to my academic 
endeavor in several ways. Through the seminar, Perspectives on Globalization, I was 
challenged to reflect on the notions of multiculturalism and the connection between 
historical grievances and contemporary global conflicts. Through my independent study 
on the Oromo diaspora, I began to realize the greater gravity of the failed Ethiopian 
project. Stories of the diaspora revealed complexities of defining one’s home and 
political identity. I was brought to reflect even more deeply on this during my brief 
Harvard Divinity Exploration Program. Through Professor Michael Jackson’s lecture on 
the “The Politics of Storytelling,” I began to locate diasporic narratives and scholarship 
as sites of knowledge production and the struggle for power and agency.  
My final International Studies seminar, Capitalism and World (Dis) Order, has 
also given me important insights and stirred my curiosities toward a deeper study of 
capitalism. As a historical phenomenon, capitalism has had an evolutionary history that is 
marked by a centre-periphery relationship. This centre-periphery relationship, however, is 
not limited to the countries between the Global North and South. Industrial capitalism 
and free-trade imperialism of the late 19th century created systems of extraction that 
affected the social fabrics of colonized countries.  As such, centre-periphery relationships 
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are also evident within each of the developing countries. Throughout this research, I hope 
evaluate the relationships between social consciousness, the division of labor and 
ownership over the means of production. This is intimately linked to both the state and 
nation-building project of the Ethiopian state.  
Both scholarly works and course discussions have given me pathways to 
developing some of my inquiries and expectations for my honors thesis. In addition, my 
largest questions come from personal experiences of witnessing inequality. On my recent 
trip to Cape Town, post-apartheid South Africa appeared full of paradoxes. Remnants of 
apartheid were visible both in the geographical makeup of the place and in the division of 
labour. From township settlements to the ongoing racial tensions, the reality of inequality 
was visibly apparent. Where wealth remains concentrated in the hands of a small 
minority, the question of economic apartheid, particularly as it relates to landownership, 
remains heavily contested. As I do my research, I will address key questions concerning 
land ownership and reflect on the realities of inequality on the lines of ethnicity.   
VI. Organization 
The second chapter of my thesis will begin with the review of the literature 
looking at four prime concepts.  The first concept is that of the state. The discussion on 
the state is further subdivided to investigate the “predatory theory” and situate the state-
building project within regional and internationalist perspectives. The second concept is 
that of nations and nationalism. Modernist perspectives of nationhood and nationalism in 
the context of Africa will further be discussed in this section. The third concept, world 
order, will evaluate the three dominant economic moments in history: the liberal creed, 
embedded liberalism and the neoliberal order. The last concept is that of development. 
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This concept will be highlighted through a brief historical exposition and will provide the 
different ways development has been conceptualized to fit modern and changing 
contexts.   
The third chapter will assess the state-formation process during the time of 
Menelik II (1889-1913). Understanding the territorial construction of the Ethiopian state 
at this particular period will situate Ethiopia amongst Europe’s Scramble for Africa and 
the pursuit for capitalist gains. This chapter is devoted to evaluating the interlinked 
processes of war-making, state-making, extraction and protection based on Charles 
Tilly’s evaluation of Western Europe’s state formation process; this is similar to 
Ethiopia’s process of state development at the time of Menelik II. The fourth chapter will 
evaluate the Ethiopian state under the leadership of Emperor Haile Selassie (1931-1974). 
As a reformer, Emperor Haile Selassie provided critical changes that placed the country 
on the path of modernization and development. However, the time of the Emperor holds a 
great contradiction between new infrastructures that transformed Ethiopia’s traditional 
institutions and regressive socio-political systems that reinstated the Emperor’s 
hegemony.  
The fifth chapter will look at the process of state transformation at the time of 
Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974-1991). The Ethiopian Student Movement spearheaded the 
struggle against vestiges of feudalism, imperialism and capitalism. This chapter will 
reveal the inherent contradictions between building a socialist society while also keeping 
a high-level of state-centralization to secure hegemony over the periphery. The sixth 
chapter will assess EPRDF party ideology. Key areas of assessment in this chapter are 
assets and shortcomings of ethnic federalism and the place of the neoliberal order in 
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shaping Ethiopia’s political economy. The concluding chapter of my thesis addresses key 
findings, lessons and future inquiries. These will include reflections on the importance of 
history and the place of both internal and external forces in shaping Ethiopia’s political 
contradictions.  
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
I. The State 
 
The state, as an ultimate condensation of public power, is the centre of gravity for 
collective authority. Samuel Finer (1975, 86) suggests that contemporary states possess 
the following five characteristics: (1) territorially defined population with central organ 
of government,  (2) such territory has, to a great extent, secured territorial sovereignty, 
(3) the organ of government has a specialized personnel such as the civil service and the 
military service,  (4) the population has ideally horizontal links which forms a sense of 
common nationality or “community of feeling” and, finally, (5) the population has to 
varying degrees distributed forms of gains and duties. Key to the study of the state and 
particularly the organ of government is the concept of power.  Power is defined as who 
gets what, when and how. The question of who gets left out is also equally important. 
Power gives one the capacity to influence and is determined by the means of compliance. 
Power can be taxonomized into four categories: physical power or immediate application 
of force (military power), economic power (means of capital accumulation or access to 
livelihood), political power (organizing institutions such as church groups and unions) 
and cultural power (ideas and the creation of intersubjectivity) (Samatar 2014).  
Samatar and Samatar (2002) showcase five typologies of the state. These 
categories are treated as capturing discrete kinds of political entities. The ideal integral 
state enables a network of collective services to function and does not reduce its citizens 
to despair and carnage. This type of state is emblematic of a moment of integral balance. 
In a Gramscian sense, this type of state is congruent to an effective state. An effective 
state not only succeeds in delivering public goods but, particularly important, the 
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leadership generates a degree of moral and intellectual bonding with its citizens. This 
“organic” affiliation is central to what he calls “hegemony” or the establishment of the 
“national-popular.” Presently, there does not exist an integral African state. A 
developmentalist state is one that is conspicuously active in the improvement of human 
capital and the enhancement of the productive forces and national accumulation. This 
state is driven by the ambition to rapidly mollify (reduce) societal vulnerability. 
However, this often comes at the expense of civic pluralism and basic liberties (Samatar 
and Samatar 2002, 9). This type of state is strong when it comes to resource management 
and building economic capacity but proves relatively weak in encouraging robust citizen 
participation. A prime example of this type of state is Botswana. The third type of state, a 
Prebendalist State, is typically preoccupied with protection and reproduction of 
immediate interests of the regime and its associates. A key characteristic of this type of 
rentier state is high dependency—“a combination of subservience to external powers, 
venality and despotism at home” (Samatar and Samatar 2002, 10). The fourth type of 
state, a predatory state shows degradation of state structure and institutions and resources 
become heavily contested. In a cadaverous state, life is nasty and brutish and the reality 
becomes war of all against all (Samatar 2002, 9-12).  
 In his book, Seeing like a State, James Scott (1998) speaks to the idea of legibility 
that builds and sustains the state-apparatus. The classic functions of taxation, conscription 
and the prevention of rebellions are ways to make society legible (Scott 1988, 2).  The 
process of sedentarization and the organization of social and natural functions become 
part of “seeing like the state.” The above state typologies hold a degree of societal 
legibility or command over the population; as such, the growth of the state and state-
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function is not only dictated by its monopoly over violence, but also its monopoly over 
societal legibility. Scott further argues that state-led arrangement have four of the 
following pernicious elements: administrative ordering of nature and society, high-
modernist ideology, the use of power by an authoritarian state for the materialization of 
high-modernist ideology, and an unresistant civil society (Scott 1988, 5). As this entails a 
great deal of manipulation, society becomes ordered through both the dictates of global 
and domestic hegemons (Scott 1988, 183).  
 Within the contours of the state, the hegemonic drive is defined within the 
political context as the pursuit of a regime, through utilizing different political and social 
institutions, to gain legitimacy through attending to the interest of the non-dominant class 
in the society. The hegemonic drive is at its optimal state when there is a balance between 
its two vital cells: dominance and consensus. This means that both the dominant and the 
dominated classes accept the right to rule and to be ruled. Consensus is the expected 
outcome when the interests of the people are taken into account. When the hegemony 
begins to fall into decadence, the domination begins to supersede consensus, resulting in 
the loss of legitimacy and the building up of a counter- hegemonic drive. Patrick Chabal 
asserts, “If the legitimacy of power diminishes, it carries less authority, leading to a 
counter hegemonic drive” (Chabal 1992, 164).  The counter-hegemonic drive is governed 
to some extent by political morality—the assessment of the hegemon’s compliance to a 
constitutional or political order that is meant to, in some way, balance its power and 
assert its accountability to the civil society (Chabal 1992, 164).  
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 A. Predatory Theory and the State  
The bellicist account, otherwise known as the predatory theory, documents earlier 
European state-formation. In Tilly’s renowned aphorism, “War made the state, and the 
state made war” (quoted in Taylor and Botea 2008, 27). Based on an extensive historical 
analysis of modern European states, the bellicist perspective reinstates war as the primary 
and central means of extraction, critical in building a centralized state apparatus (Thies 
2009, 625).  In other words, the predatory theory treats war as the primary vehicle for 
institutional development, in which the need to extract resources necessitates the 
establishment of centralized state institutions. The defining factor of state building is the 
state’s ability to penetrate society to extract revenues and resources. Extraction is needed 
in order to build the capacity of the state and to develop its administrative institutions 
(Kisangani 2014, 2). Tilly analogizes this process of Western European state-formation in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century to “organized crime” (Tilly 1985) involving three 
interrelated processes: war-making, extraction and capital accumulation (Tilly 1985, 
172).   
Tilly uses the analogy of criminal protection rackets to explain the dynamics of 
early-modern European state formation. Through the racketeering analogy, he 
demonstrates that state leaders, like criminal syndicates, create threats that only they can 
mitigate--for a price. The interdependent processes of war-making and state-making 
thereby function as “protection rackets” to secure power for the state-builders (Tilly 
1985, 169). As the state sells security in exchange for revenues, it develops organized 
means for coercive extraction and protection. Many governments could be said to operate 
as racketeers since “the repressive and extractive activities of governments often 
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constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens” (Tilly 1985, 
171). Though Tilly is drawing parallels between organized crime racketeering and state-
building, rulers don’t set out to run crime syndicates. Instead, they often produce danger 
while also providing a shield against it (Tilly 1985, 171).  
As part of this effort to consolidate their authority, “wielders of coercion” 
(Leander 2004, 4) become responsible for what Tilly and other bellicist scholars identify 
as war-making, state-making, protection and extraction (Tilly 1985, 181). These 
interrelated processes yield organizational features that constitute the modern 
characteristics of a centralized nation-state. It is critical to note that power holders did not 
engage in the war-making, extraction and capital accumulation processes to construct the 
nation-state; instead, nation-states became the by-products of securing power and 
exercising authority in expanded territories through war-making.   
War-making, which involves establishing a monopoly over the means of coercion 
to fight against outside intruders or enemies, calls for the establishment of a standing 
army and related coercive mechanisms and organizations (Tilly 1985, 181). Waging war 
is a costly endeavor and takes great investment of human and financial capital. In order to 
secure resources for war, European rulers had to locate and secure capital through 
outright conquest, selling assets or forcefully dispossessing those with capital (Tilly 
1985, 172). What this produced in the long-term was organized systems that ensured 
“regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit” and regular forms of 
taxation within a particular territory (Tilly 1985, 172). In this process, state-builders 
strengthened their administrative capacity through state bureaucracies, mapped their 
territories and gathered needed information for capital accumulation (Robinson 2002, 
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512). European rulers often provided ways to protect their inside supporters. Institutions 
such as courts and assemblies took shape in the processes of guaranteeing demanded 
protection by the ruled (Tilly 1985, 181). The more costly the war-making activity, all 
other variables being equal, “the greater the organizational residue” (Tilly 1985, 181).  
The competition over territory and capital as a result of war-making led to the 
unintended consequence: the state or the development of a state-apparatus (Leander 2004, 
4). Before the French Revolution, Tilly notes that the use of local magnates as indirect 
rulers was key in ensuring protection and governance among European provinces. These 
magnates “collaborated with the government without becoming officials in any strong 
sense of the term, had some access to government backed force, and exercised wide 
discretion within their own territories” (Tilly 1985, 174). However, the state magnates 
also were potential enemies and possible allies of opposition in the region (Tilly 1985, 
174). Thus, the use of indirect-rule decreased with two distinct strategies: (1) dispatching 
officials to local provinces and communities (2) Encouraging the build-up of subordinate 
police forces (Tilly 1985, 174). In the earlier European experience, supporters of the 
state, which carried out the protective and extractive processes for state consolidation, 
were generally “landlords, armed retainers of the monarch, and churchmen” (Tilly 1985, 
181).  
In addition to building the administrative capacity to secure power within a 
territory, the process of state building entailed eliminating or neutralizing enemies inside 
the territory. This took the form of establishing surveillance systems and bureaucratic 
forms of guaranteeing control within the territory (Tilly 1985, 181). Emphasizing the 
interaction between the processes of war-making and state-making, Sorenson writes, 
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“Before the full consolidation of state power, would-be rulers always had to think in 
terms of two-front battles, against ‘domestic’ as well as against ‘international’ 
opponents” (Sorenson 2001, 346). Developing the administrative state apparatus was 
critical in protecting given territories from both outside intruders as well as inside 
enemies.  
Tilly describes the protection that is provided by the wielders of coercion in the 
state-building process as a double-edged protection. Again, functioning as a racketeer, 
this means that state agents produce “both the danger and, at a price, the shield against [a 
threat]” (Tilly 1985, 171). Thus, governments can “commonly simulate, stimulate, or 
even fabricate threats of external war” and create protective mechanism to further counter 
opposition (Tilly 1985, 171). Providing protective mechanisms is intrinsically linked to 
the state-building process. Protection in the Tillyan approach involves securing allies 
internally and providing protection for “domestic players that support their rule” 
(Kisangani and Pickering 2014, 2). Protection of allies also means repression of rivalries 
in the state (Taylor and Botea 2008, 29).  
A state that is able to secure internal supporters and eliminate opposition 
strengthens its capacity to extract resources (Tilly 1985, 181). Extraction, the means by 
which the above three processes take place, manifests in fiscal policies and administrative 
capacities which allow agents of states to penetrate society to secure human and material 
capital (Tilly 1985, 181). In the narrative of state-building in Europe, Tilly claims that 
“mercantile capitalism and state-making reinforced each other” (Tilly 1985, 170). Rulers 
of the state have to manage their relationship with the polity through concessions and 
negotiations in order to secure their power: “Extracting financial resources requires 
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bargaining with those controlling these resources” (Leander 2004, 5). The process of 
extraction thereby yielded notions of rights, citizenship, and legitimacy, which were 
critical in sustaining state-society relations.  
State-builders also have to provide a level of protection in order to secure 
legitimacy for the process of extraction. Miguel Angel Centeno speaks further to the 
state's extractive power. Borrowing the term from Michael Mann (1988), he notes that 
growth of state administration and centralization provides the state with infrastructural 
power—“the capacity to penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political 
decisions throughout the realm” (Centeno 2003, 86). This process of trade-off between 
rulers and the ruled also creates a body of civil servants who express their demands to the 
state and play a role in building the state infrastructure (Leander 2004, 5). The process of 
penetration often takes different forms: “Extraction, for instance, ranges from outright 
plunder to regular tribute to bureaucratized taxation” (Tilly 1985, 181).  Successful 
processes of empire-building or state-building offer the opportunity to capture economies 
of scale. Although most significant in capturing new trade and finance endeavors, these 
economies of scale also affect industrial production (Tilly 1985, 179). In the European 
experience, centralized state taxation also channeled peasant production into the 
international market, further augmenting “the opportunities for trade creation and 
economic specialization” (Tilly 1985, 179). Therefore, mechanisms of mercantile 
capitalism that encouraged capital accumulation or extraction were intimately interlinked 
with state consolidation (Tilly 1985, 170). 
To summarize, the European experience shows a great lord engaging in effective 
war-making to become dominant in a given territory. War-making capacity entails 
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securing human and material capital.  This leads to extractive means to secure resources 
in order to make war-making possible. Securing successful extractive means of creating 
violence entailed “elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great lord’s local 
rivals” leading to the process of state-making (Tilly 1985, 183). State structures such as 
military organizations, war industries, and schools also become part of the war-making 
and state-building process. To sustain the state apparatus, agents of the state ally with 
different social classes. This reality opens the discussion for the engagement of culture, 
vital in sustaining the bellicist account. The processes of war-making, state-making, 
protection and extraction converge to develop a centralized state apparatus.  
B. Expanding the Bellicist Account: Some Regional Perspectives 
The predatory theory has influenced thinkers that analyze state consolidation in 
regions outside of Europe. Herbst (2000) and Centeno (2002) argue that conditions in 
Africa and Latin America, respectively, impede the experience of interstate total war that 
was crucial for state-building shown in the European context (Taylor and Botea 2008, 
20). Through his analysis of Latin American countries, Centeno interrogates the nature of 
intrastate war that facilitate state-formation. He categorizes external war-making into two 
categories: total and limited war. Centeno argues, “states in Latin America have had and 
continue to have severe limitations on the types of wars they may engage in, while these 
wars never develop into the kind of struggles that produce more powerful states” 
(Centeno 2003, 82). Total wars usually consist of vast casualties, are based on some kind 
of moral or ideological crusade, and consist of vastly militarized society that produces 
institutions orientated toward complete victory. They also secure an amassed support and 
engage the state’s inhabitants directly and/or indirectly in war (Centeno 2003, 83). 
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According to Centeno’s argument, total wars “produce richer, more powerful states” 
(Centeno 2003, 83) as their capacity to extract from society is fully optimized. This is 
also facilitated through the greater loyalty secured between the population and the state 
(Centeno 2003, 83). Centeno contrasts the total-war experience to what he calls limited 
war. He contends that “limited war” characterizes much of the Latin America experience. 
Limited wars are often geographically constrained to few areas with overall short 
durations, fought between those with similar ideologies over economic or territorial 
issues and do not consist of mass political or military mobilization that sustain emotional 
fervor and a sense of loyalty to the state except in the initial moments of war (Centeno 
2003, 84).     
In evaluating the challenges of state building in Africa, Herbst (2000) emphasizes 
that state-formation in Africa differed from the earlier European experiences. High 
population density and scarcity of land did not persist in pre-colonial Africa. The process 
of state-formation in African countries also did not consist of war-making and state-
making, critical in development of state administration and infrastructure in European 
countries. In other words, post-colonial African states were not the “organic” products of 
external war. African leaders inherited political structures from the colonial era and were 
left to deal with the internal implications of an exported nation-state model. The creation 
of Sub-Saharan African states from the outside had great implication to the development 
of leadership in the countries:  “that act of external creation left domestic contenders 
inside the states with a free reign to do whatever they pleased to their subject populations 
and to each other” (Sorensen 2001, 347).  
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Further articulating the challenges facing African leaders to build strong and 
cohesive states, Herbst notes: “The fundamental problem facing state-builders in 
Africa—be they precolonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent 
era—has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low 
densities of people” (Herbst 2000, 11). Herbst posits the challenges of state-building in 
the context of political geography. Unlike Europe, land in Africa was abundant and thus, 
pre-colonial African states were not driven by scarcity to fight over territory. Therefore, 
states did not have to create state administration to defend their boundaries and further 
extract from society to sustain administrative capacity (Robinson 2002, 513).  According 
to Herbst, the lack of state-development due to low population density, intrastate rivalry 
over territory, and permanent establishment of colonial boundaries and Cold-War politics 
could help explain the persistence of weak states in Sub-Saharan African states 
(Robinson 2002, 513-518). Herbst further notes the ecological diversity and geographical 
features of Sub-Saharan Africa that prove costly in the projection of power, thereby 
impeding the process of state-consolidation (Herbst 2000, 12-13).  
Both Centeno and Herbst offer regional perspectives outside of the European 
experience. Centeno integrates the state-building process in Latin America through 
evaluating the nature or magnitude of war. As such, he argues that total wars demand 
greater extraction for the building of state institutions. Herbst considers other variables 
such as political geography and colonial expansionism that situate the African state-
building experience. As previously noted, the Tillyan account of state-building is 
sufficient in explaining state-consolidation relevant to the European experience. 
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However, it fails to take note of changing international orders that shape contemporary 
state formation and consolidation.  
C. State-building: Internationalist Perspectives  
Fixed Borders, Intervention and the Changing Nature of War 
 
Scholars from the world systems approach draw attention to international systems 
that impact contemporary state-building processes. In doing so, they evaluate the realities 
of strong/weak state dynamics through the global context and persistent, hegemonic 
power structures. More preciously, the structures of the international system have 
changed so much that earlier forms of state building processes cannot be replicated. Their 
critique is important as the nature of states and state-making in the twenty-first century 
differ drastically from sixteenth and seventeenth century of Europe. International norms 
and institutions thus play a significant role in the making and unmaking of contemporary 
states. This calls for the assessment of state dynamics in light of current international 
norms and institutions.    
In assessing state-formation processes, Atzili (2006/2007) critiques fixed borders 
and the norm of territorial sovereignty after WWII. Atzili concludes that international 
norms lead to the unintended consequences of weak-states: “states that lack legitimate 
and effective governmental institutions” (Atzili 2006/07, 139). These weak-states, in turn, 
become the breeding ground for greater instability and intrastate conflicts (Atzili 
2006/07, 139). Atzili advances a threefold argument: first, the norm of fixed borders 
impedes the natural process of state centralization as a response to external rivalry (Atzili 
2006/07, 140). Similar to Herbst’s argument, this point draws from the predatory theory, 
which reinstates war as motor for institutional development. Territorial sovereignty has 
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been established as an inviolable norm or principle, which discourages interstate rivalry 
and, thus, impedes earlier European state-formation processes. Second, the lack of such 
external threat fails to facilitate a sense of internal cohesion and a common identity 
among the subjects, further undermining “loyalty” to the state (Atzili 2006/07, 140). 
Noting on the place of war as a means for this loyalty, Atzili comments: “The relative 
ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of contemporary European states is a product, rather 
than a precondition, of the state-building process” (Atzili 2006/07, 147). In other words, 
the dual process of war-making and state-making created not only the state but provided 
the means for the construction of the nation.   
Sorensen links the reality of fixed borders with the rise of intrastate conflicts in 
the contemporary world. He notes that international norms and fixed borders brought 
Third-World armies “to face inward” and to fight battles within fixed boundaries to 
secure legitimacy (Sorensen 2001, 346). In other words, fixed borders established a norm 
by which countries could no longer engage in external conflict (war-making) but instead 
engage in internal rivalry (state-making). Thirdly, Atzili notes that there is no mechanism 
with which strong states could overtake weak states (Atzili 2006/07, 140). The barring of 
annexation further perpetuates the conditions of weak-states. Atzili’s argument provides a 
great paradox: fixed borders, which were initially introduced to undermine conflicts, are 
instead playing a critical role in the rise of intrastate conflicts.     
In light of territorial integrity, Atzili problematizes the link between war-making 
and state-building. Although this perspective brings us closer to evaluating contemporary 
phenomenon of weak-states, Atzili’s argument does not take note of other direct and 
indirect interventions by outside powers, which have serious implications to state-
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formation as well as intrastate conflicts. Sorensen’s scholarship best captures this 
argument: “the respect for existing borders did not mean that stronger states refrained 
from any kind of involvement whatsoever. Within the framework of existing territorial 
demarcations, they indeed felt free to pursue their political and economic interests in 
most any way that they saw fit” (Sorensen 2001, 348).  Furthermore, Sorenson evokes 
dependency theory in articulating the economic behaviors of core states in relation to 
peripheralized, weak states that perpetuate strong-weak state relations. He further 
highlights another irony created by the international context: “the situation of post-
colonial states is indeed peculiar: their continued existence as states is guaranteed by the 
international system, but the pursuit of political and economic interest by stronger states 
has frequently hindered the process of state-building” (Sorensen 2001, 348).  
Conditions of developing countries today reveal the complex impact of the 
international systems in state-formation. Luttwak (1999) critiques international 
interventions that, in the end, undermine sustainable peace. He argues that the 
establishment of the United Nations and the hegemony of the Security Council impede 
the natural process of war-making that leads to peace (Luttwak 1999, 37). Thus, he 
proposes for wars to persist until these endemic conflicts potentially transform into 
peace-either through both parties declaring truce or the weaker surrendering. Further 
showcasing the European experience of war-making which led to state-building, Luttwak 
writes, “An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does 
have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen 
when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively” (Luttwak 1999, 
36). Because total wars could ultimately result in peace, Luttwak critiques imposed 
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cease-fires and armistice by multilateral organizations in the conflicts worldwide. This, 
he argues can perversely “prevent the transformation of war into peace” (Luttwak 1999, 
37). He further argues, “If the United Nations helped the strong defeat the weak faster 
and more decisively, it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war” 
(Luttwak 1999, 38). Because interventions impede the “transformative effects of both 
decisive victory and expansion” Luttwak stands with the proposition that wars should 
persist (Luttwak 1999, 44).   
Further critiquing the nature of war in light of these international systems, 
Kisangani and Pickering (2014) argue that previous literatures on warfare fails to 
consider the activities of transnational rebel groups. They hypothesize military 
intervention of states against transnational insurgents or rebels are central to state-
consolidation (Kisangani and Pickering 2014, 4). This is because the increased level of 
extraction needed for state-building depends on the military might of post-colonial states 
fighting transnational insurgents or rebels (Kisangani and Pickering 2014, 2). Their 
argument echoes the assertion made by Tilly decades ago: “War makes states, I shall 
claim. Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war making all belong on the 
same continuum—that I shall claim as well” (Tilly 1985, 170). Whether it is fighting 
piracy off the coast of Somalia or strengthening military powers such as Ethiopia in 
fighting terrorism in the Horn, this particular scholarship opens further conversation on 
the changing nature of warfare and its implications on the enabled extractive capacity of 
the state.  
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II. Nationhood and Nationalism 
 
Although the concepts of state-building and nation-building are often used 
interchangeably, they hold different sets of meaning. State-building focuses on 
institutional development and the building of governmental apparatus through employing 
physical and political power. Although these are also evidently used in the nation-
building process, cultural power takes precedence in establishing a sense of communal 
consciousness or a community of feeling: “a nation can and has been defined as a 
population conscious of its common nationality” (Finer 1975, 88). A nation generally 
describes a distinct people, defined by a common ancestry, history and language 
(Bamidele 2015, 12). Out of these components arise expressions of Nationalism.  
Nationalism appears in different forms and expressions across societies. In places 
like Germany and Italy, the concept of a “nation” has operated as a movement that 
unified culturally divided peoples. In the colonized worlds of Africa, the Caribbean and 
parts of Asia, nationalism has served as a means for self-assertion and as a weapon 
against colonial structures (Young 2007, 246). Crawford Young identifies the core 
principles of nationalism as an ideology of human solidarity based on shared history, 
common destiny, and the right to independent political community (Young 2007, 246). 
The idea of a nation is closely linked to that of self-determination and the normative 
notion of popular sovereignty (Young 2007, 246). This concept also lends the state a 
level of legitimacy both domestically and internationally.  
A. Nationalism: Highlighting Modernist Perspectives  
Scholars of the modernist perspective often see Europe as the birthplace of 
nationalism (Crawford 2007, 246). Earlier understandings of nationalism are associated 
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with the rise of modernization in Europe (Smith 1995; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). 
The ideology that underlines processes of modernity and the birth of such nationalism 
trace their roots to late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Enlightenment period. 
European enlightenment perspectives upheld the ideals of reason and progress and a 
universalized notion of history, which links nationalism to the rise of modern democracy 
(Chatterjee 1986, 3).  In his writings, Ernest Gellner sees modernity as having a distinct 
form of culture and social organization. He identities industrialization, as a distinct 
element of modernization, as a key factor in constructing the nation in Europe. As 
outlined by Enlightenment perspectives, industrialization set the stage for a “rational and 
objective approach to life” that demanded the reorganization of labor (Palmer 1998, 4). In 
other words, these economic and social forces brought by industrialization were 
prerequisites for nationalism.  
According to Gellner, “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds 
that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983, 1). This means 
that nationalism is found within the political boundaries of the state. Further affirming the 
congruency between an established state and nationalism, Gellner writes,   “nationalism 
emerges only in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for 
granted” (Gellner 1983, 4). The process of industrialization, which underlines 
nationalism, is also coupled with the project of cultural homogeneity.  Nationalized 
education system that appeals to a political unit as well as a “folk culture” that defines 
this particularized territory further give the nation platform for expression   (Palmer 1998, 
4). Gellner interestingly hints at the destructive nature of such nationalism project. He 
demystifies the myth that nationalism is the product of new units, constructed from the 
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“raw material of the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist 
world” (Geller 1983, 48).  Instead, nationalism is recognized as having an authoritarian 
and destructive nature that uproots previously established orders and traditions:  
Nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on 
society...It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with 
mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a 
shared culture of this kind, in place of previous complex structure of local 
groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically 
by the micro-groups themselves (Gellner 1983, 56).  
 
Like Gellner, Benedict Anderson (1983) attributes the creation of a nation to 
another modernization moment: the rise of print capitalism. As the search for markets 
grew larger, the idea of print-as-commodity facilitated the formation of a distinct type of 
community and further accentuated the appearance of the state (Anderson 1991, 37). 
Anderson notes that by 1500, at least 20,000,000 books had been printed, allowing for the 
dissemination of greater print materials and knowledge in Europe (Anderson 1991, 37). 
What print-capitalism did, he asserts, is assemble the distinct “idiolects” of pre-print 
Europe into distinct territorial units (Anderson 1991, 43).  Anderson argues that the print-
languages laid the foundation for national consciousness in three distinct ways. First, 
print-as-commodity developed unified arenas of mass communication and exchange 
below Latin and above vernacular languages (Anderson 1991, 44).  Anderson writes, 
“Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it 
difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of 
comprehending one another via print and paper” (Anderson 1991, 44). Connections with 
fellow-readers through print carved out the space for an imagined community. Second, a 
new “fixity to language” was created through print-capitalism; this fixity gave language 
an image of antiquity, critical in the idea and the subjective experience of a “nation” 
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rooted in time and space (Anderson 1991, 44). Third, a type of “languages-of-power” 
were created, as certain dialects become dominant in the final print forms while others 
failed to have their own form of print dissemination (Anderson 1991, 44). The three ways 
print capitalism facilitated the idea of a nation is underlined by the interplay between 
“fatality, technology, and capitalism” (Anderson 1991, 43).  
Anderson proposes a more constructivist perspective to the nation as an 
“imagined political community” (Anderson 1983, 6). Although nationhood finds its 
expression within the confines of the state, he argues that a nation represents “cultural 
artifacts of a particular kind” (Anderson 1983, 4). A nation is imagined into existence 
through the rise of print capitalism, mass communications and literacy (Palmer 1998, 6). 
In addition, Anderson provides three characteristics of such imagined political 
community as limited, sovereign and consisting of a particularized community (Anderson 
1983, 7). As Anderson notes, the nation is limited in that its imagination is not 
“coterminous with mankind” (Anderson 1983, 7). In other words, a nation is defined by a 
specific space and time that is finite and distinct to a given population. Second, this 
imagined political community is also sovereign; the nation is a product of the liberal 
thinking, which ruled out “divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” (Anderson 
1983, 7). Unlike the previously established divine authority, the sovereign state is now 
endowed with freedom and equality in governing a religious, pluralist society. The third 
and most pertinent aspect of a nation is its distinction as a political community. Anderson 
conceives of the nation as reinstating a horizontal bond with those in the same political 
boundary (Anderson 1983, 7). Therefore, a sort of social contract that exists among 
citizens strengthens the imagination of a nation.  
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B. Nationalism: Critiquing the fields of invention and imagination 
 
Gellner’s view of nationalism begins with the congruence of the political and 
national unit. He also asserts that industrialization, as key component of modernization, 
facilitated the process of nationalism in Europe. Furthermore, Gellner provides 
that  “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents 
nations where they do not exist” (Gellner 1964, 169). Anderson critiques Gellner’s 
understanding of nationalism as its relation to the idea of “invention.”  To Anderson, 
“invention” underlines nationalism that has a fictitious or fabricated undertone. Anderson 
writes, “Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences 
that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and 
‘creation.’ In this way he implies that ‘true’ communities exist which can be 
advantageously juxtaposed to nations”(Anderson 1983, 6). According to Anderson, all 
communities are the product of some sort of imagination. Therefore, “Communities are to 
be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are 
imagined” (Anderson 1983, 6).  Imagining the community as limited, as sovereign and as 
a political community yields the prototype of a nation.    
Partha Chatterjee (1993) also provides a unique critique and a worthy question to 
consider in light of Anderson’s idea of an imagined political community.  Considering 
the experiences of the postcolonial world, Chatterjee inquires: “If nationalisms in the rest 
of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain “modular” forms 
already made available to them by Europe and other Americas, what do they have left to 
imagine?” (Chatterjee 1993, 5). Chatterjee’s question deals with the ownership of history 
and the lack of agency in imagining an “authentic” nation. Chatterjee also takes issue 
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with the definition of the “nation” which draws from its nature as a political organization 
both in the writings of Gellner and Anderson. Chatterjee argues that: “anticolonial 
nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it 
begins its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of 
social institutions and practices into two domains—the material and the spiritual” 
(Chatterjee 1993, 6). To him, nationalism inhabits both the spiritual and the material 
realm of social institutions. Chatterjee characterizes the spiritual realm as “an ‘inner’ 
domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity” (Chatterjee 1993, 6). These 
include areas such as language, literature, drama and the family that serve as legitimate 
spaces of sovereignty and agency (Chatterjee 1993, 6-7). The area of the material realm 
speaks to things such as the economy, statecraft, science and technology. These, 
Chatterjee argues, are characterized by Western dominance and superiority (Chatterjee 
1993, 6). Through such distinctions, Chatterjee restores a sense of agency and authority 
over one’s own political and social history.  
The question of authority and agency also arises in Chatterjee’s critique of 
Gellner’s work. Geller exposes the dynamic processes of nationalism that seem to flow 
from the imperatives of industrialism. There is also a process of interdigitation, by which 
such “high culture” is woven into power structures both at the macro and micro levels. 
Despite the intriguing sociological look at nationalism via industrialization, Gellner fails 
to evaluate the question of “alien imposition” whereas this “high culture” is the product 
of an outside-imposed order (Chatterjee 1986, 6). One reason for this is Gellner’s focus 
on the European experience of nation-building. Chatterjee also provides another critique 
of Gellner’s ideas at the level of epistemology and political philosophy. According to 
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Chatterjee, Gellner’s evaluation of the creation of such “atomized individuals” and 
“impersonal society” is evaluated at the surface from a sociological perspective. As a 
scholar of subaltern identities, Chatterjee is well aware of the flow of dominant ideas that 
move both domestic and global history in hegemonic directions. Thus, this project of 
nationalism—with an “alien imposition” of a “high culture”—becomes a universal 
project in the hands of the dominant. In the post-colonial experience, the establishment of 
such paradigms set a ruling framework that cripples organic and free imaginations in the 
nation-building experience.  
C. Nation-building and Nationalism: The African Context  
 
“Modern European intellectual fashion not only decrees that a nation must have a past, it 
also demands that it have a future. Have faith in the historical progress of man, it 
preaches, and history will not let you down” (Chatterjee 1986, 9).  
 
As Alexander (1990) notes, Eurocentric perspectives of the nation translated into 
hegemonic projects of constructing the nation in African states. In other words, a 
universalized framework of a nation, which draws its meaning from the rational and 
progressive ideas of the Enlightenment, came to define nationalism and underpins its 
imported caricature in the non-European world (Chatterjee 1986, 11). Speaking to the 
Sub-Saharan post-colonial African experience, Crawford notes that political agency is the 
product of the intertwined “selfhoods” of nationality, ethnicity and citizenship (Young 
2007, 242).  Although state boundaries were merely colonial constructs, African notion 
of nationalism is intimately attached to “created” territories--even if the state institutions 
prove dysfunctional or derelict (Young 2007, 241). To put Crawford’s assertion in the 
context of Anderson's “imagined community” concept, territory becomes the inherited, 
rather imposed, imaginative framework for nationhood and agency in Africa. In addition, 
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most secessionist claims and movements in Africa have been based on colonial territorial 
designations and subdivisions (Young 2007, 244).  
The building of a national identity among multi- ethnic, multi-linguistic and 
multi- religious communities continues to pose challenges for many African states. Basil 
Davidson describes the curse of the nation-state as The Black Man’s Burden (Davidson 
1992). Post-Independence era, the project of building the nation-state based on the 
European model commenced with fervor. This political structure stood as the only route 
toward real progress and a unit of development rooted in the ideas of modernization: 
“modernization, as it at once appeared, had to mean the wholesale import of non-African 
scenarios and solutions” (Davidson 1992, 199). For most of the African leaders, they 
treated independence not as a time of departure but arrival: “Accepting the nation-state 
that was offered to them, the pioneering nationalists saw no useful alternative and asked 
no further questions about its credentials or potentials” (Davidson 1992, 168). Thus, the 
new carved out national sovereignties accepted their fate without much retaliation at first. 
However, the three strands that came to characterize the state--territorial inheritance and 
awkwardness, illegal trade and inherent contradictions between dictatorship and 
democracy—manifested themselves more evidently in the 1980s (Davidson 1992, 215). 
The ecological context would also prove challenging as European practices of 
exploitation and “development” took their toll on African bodies and livelihoods.  
III. World Order  
 
Robert Cox defines world order as a “historical structure” of global relations. 
World order is characterized by three elements: ideas, institutions and material 
capabilities. While intersubjective ideas point to the shared nature of social relations that 
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create meaning and reproduce certain habits and behavior, collective images of social 
order are the beliefs and perceptions held outside of the inner group and, thus, create 
different meanings and interpretations. Unlike intersubjective ideas that constitute shared 
foundations for social discourse, collective images bring forth rival ideas that hold 
potential for different trajectories to prevalent world orders. For Cox, then, justified by 
dominant ideas, institutions undergird and operationalize a particular set of human 
relations and world order; in this sense, they underscore power relations existing at the 
beginning (Samatar 2015). The political economic history of Europe and the United 
States can be characterized by three distinct periods: the liberal order of the late 19th and 
20th century, embedded liberalism of the Keynesian era, and the neoliberal order of the 
contemporary world. These economic and social paradigms held both domestic and 
international policy implications in the colonized and the developing world. 
A. The Liberal Creed 
Although Gilbert Rist situates the problem of self-definition during the rise of 
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ rhetoric in the mid-20th century (Rist 2014), Polanyi's 
The Great Transformation traces the problem to the early 19th century with the rise of the 
liberal creed. As a secular religion, the liberal creed launched to create a utopian world, 
undergirded by the following three tenets: a competitive labor market, the gold standard, 
and international free trade (Polanyi 1944, 141). Although laissez-faire was pursued as an 
end in of itself, the liberal creed also served as a “vehicle for destruction” (Polanyi 1944, 
164).  This secular faith demanded for the uprooting and annihilation of social and 
cultural institutions in order to make way for the functioning of the free-market. Later 
exported to the colonized world, this disorganization of society was evident among 
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English laboring class of the early 19th century (Polanyi 1944, 165). By destroying the 
very institutions that gave reason to man’s existence, the liberal project took away the 
means for self-definition. In response to the liberal project, the countermovement 
emerged to reclaim the “self” through different groups, sections and classes. Polanyi 
insightfully notes that these collectivist measures were about social recognition (Polanyi 
1944, 160). Although the liberal creed defined itself as an economic project, the 
countermovement revealed otherwise; the struggle for maintaining organizations and 
institutions that were critical to the self-definition question retaliated against the 
reorganization of human and societal life by the liberal creed. 
B. Embedded Liberalism  
 The immediate post-war period led to many problems predominantly facing the 
North. WWII left war-torn European countries in dire need for assistance and the United 
States, the only big power left standing, aided in the reconstruction process. The 
economic volatility wrought by the free-market, the problem of deflation and crisis 
around the gold standard called for a new global economic order--that of embedded 
liberalism.  The crisis of the economic liberalism era lead to the protectionist policy of 
the welfare state that called for protective monetary policies that national policy 
autonomy (Ruggie 1982). After WWII, embedded liberalism became the dominant 
ideology that guided international monetary order. Putting aside the older practices of the 
gold standard popular among the classical liberals, proponents of embedded liberalism 
sought national autonomy through strengthened “adjustable exchange rates, international 
provision of balance-of-payments financing, and the endorsement of capital controls” 
(Helleiner 2003, 55).  
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The era of embedded liberalism, which Ruggie argues was underlined by a social 
purpose, posed the question of “self-definition” to newly independent countries. Political 
calculations of the United States, Britain and France were critical in informing monetary 
choices of Southern governments. For the newly decolonized world, the establishment of 
central banks signified more than a change in monetary policy. Central banks served the 
economic and social purpose of asserting political independence (Helleiner 2003, 68). In 
addition to controlling national monetary activity as well as promoting development 
plans directly, the various policies of embedded liberalism allowed for the state to serve 
as a site of development and protection. The state was to be led by “economic nationalist 
thinking that placed a high priority on the goal of state-led industrialization as a tool of 
nation-building” (Helleiner 2003, 62). Despite these protectionist policies and rhetoric of 
“national” independence, newly independent countries struggled to garner their economic 
autonomy and fully define themselves. 
The challenge of self-definition was partly due to the geopolitical goals of the US 
as well as the policies of ex-colonial powers.  Despite the British advising against the 
creation of central banks for the maintenance of colonial currency board, most Southern 
governments decided to establish a level of monetary and political autonomy. However, 
some Southern countries did not create national banks guided by domestic monetary 
objectives. This was a reality among ex-French colonies of West and Central Africa. 
France took harsh measures against countries that did not comply and remain within the 
CFA zone. Countries such as Guinea and Mali were given harsh ultimatums, facing a 
trade-off between central banks and level of economic autonomy and the loss of broad 
security, trade and aid (Helleiner 2003, 74). Threats of punishment served as obstacles for 
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economic self-definition. Further interrogating domestic politics, Helleiner also notes that 
conservative leaders headed the governments that remained under the CFA zone. These 
leaders held weaker nationalist ideologies and generally accepted France’s assimilation 
policies. The self-definition question was thus not only undermined by ex-colonizers and 
world powers; leaders who maintained their elite status and benefited from previous 
colonial social order also undermined the self-definition project.  
C. Neo-Liberal Order  
 The era of embedded liberalism faced many crises that changed the direction of 
the international economic order. The problem of inflation in the United States, trade 
deficits, and the rigidity of business that stagnated competition advocated for the return of 
a more liberalized economy. The developing countries also faced high-inflated energy 
costs and mounting debt that limited their economic growth and capacity to pay off loans. 
Within the new era of the neoliberal order, the route to development is paved by 
liberalization and the unmediated integration into the world economy (Wade 2003, 630). 
As shown in the previous two eras, developing countries still struggle for complete 
economic self-definition in the neoliberal order. Through different multilateral and 
bilateral agreements between developed and developing countries, Wade evidences the 
continual undermining of economic self-definition. Writing particularly on the newly 
developed countries of East Asia, he documents their battle to dictate new kinds of 
industrial and technological policies when the world system favors the continual 
dominance of developed countries (Wade 2003, 622).  
Wade also draws our attention to another critical problem--the problem of internal 
articulation. He writes, “One of the strangest silences of development thinking is the 
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silence about internal integration” (Wade 2003, 633).  The liberal order of the early 20th 
century as well as neoliberal policies of today holds international integration as a key 
tenet. Developing countries are expected to play on the field of international economy 
without first fully addressing the problem of national integration or nation self-definition. 
This has further undermined their capacity to compete in the world market. Wade further 
argues that the internal articulation question must first be addressed in order to fully 
participate in the international economic order.   
The historical and economic frontiers established by developed countries reveal 
the on-going struggles of developing countries to define themselves politically and 
economically. The case proves nuanced in the case of East Asian countries. The 
economic advancement narrative told by Amsden proposes a new model of development 
adopted by late industrializers. In almost all Third World countries, industrial output 
grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. The East Asian expansion, particularly that of 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, pose a paradox for those seeking to understand 
economic growth and development. While conventional economists predicted that the 
economic development of these countries has been based on free-market ideology, other 
economists attributed economic growth to the growing role of governments. Furthermore, 
the reality of “lateness” brought these countries to think about adopting a different 
method of growth, one that is characterized by learning or borrowing foreign technology 
from developed countries (Amsden 1990, 11). How does development by learning differ 
from that of development based on invention and innovation? To answer this question, 
Amsden identifies four critical assets: Getting relative prices ‘wrong’, conglomerates or 
diversified business groups, strategic shop-floor focus and the use of cheap labour 
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(Amsden 1990, 12-14). The state has particularly used subsidies to get relative prices 
wrong. In return for these subsidies, the government employed disciplinary mechanisms 
to “tame” businesses to act in accordance with the goals of export-led economic growth. 
Although the economic growth of “late-developers” such as Taiwan and Korea are often 
showcased as success stories, their success is often measured by how far they have 
“caught up” with developed countries (Amsden 1990). Developed countries continue to 
set the metrics of success measurement, and developing countries still lack their own 
economic paradigms to define exactly what “success” and “failure” means. Through the 
writings of Polanyi, we see the shaping of world systems through the liberal creed that 
reorganizes human and social relations forever. Helleiner’s piece responds to Ruggie’s 
assertion of the social purpose underlying embedded liberalism. The story of central 
banks and Wade’s evaluation of bilateral and multilateral agreements provide vivid 
examples to the continual struggle of developing countries to achieve economic self-
definition in the old and new era.  
IV. Development  
  
“Power always belongs to the one who can make himself the master of words” (Rist 
2014, 78). 
 
 In general terms, development is understood as the mobilization of material and 
mental capital for the purposes of advancing human flourishing. The project of change 
and growth is thus situated in a perpetual struggle to improve the wellbeing of 
individuals. The phenomenon of underdevelopment is a relationship whereby the stronger 
exploits the other with minimal cost to improve its own society; in other words, 
development of the core is dependent on the exploitation of the periphery. The greatest 
example of the underdevelopment phenomenon is the colonial experience. Through the 
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extractive economies of the core states, regions in the periphery were underdeveloped. 
Under this process of underdevelopment, undevelopment is marked with a gap between 
the potential of the natural world and the output of held by the society; in other words, 
this is the problem of inert potential that needs to be cultivated. While undevelopment is 
marked with society in relation with itself, underdevelopment is when a society is in 
relation with an external force.  
Offering a more politicized understanding of the terms “development” and 
“underdevelopment” Gilbert Rist situates the concept of underdevelopment in the post 
WWII period. In his inaugural address, President Truman laid out four points, three of 
which addressed the US’ stance in support of the United Nations Organization, future 
commitment in the reconstruction of Europe and the creation of joint defense action 
(NATO) against the Soviet (Rist 2014, 70). The fourth point, according to Rist, 
inaugurated what he called the “development age” and a new interpretation of history and 
progress (Rist 2014, 71). The first paragraph of the fourth point in the inauguration 
stated: “we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits for our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas” (quoted in Rist 2014, 70-71). Representing a synonym for 
“economically backward” areas, this was the first time the term became employed for a 
larger audience and for a wider circulation (Rist 2014, 72). It was no longer things 
developing and the fourth point made it possible to think of developing a whole region. 
This was also underlined by a power dynamic, as hegemonic forces would act on the 
other to make “development” a reality:  “Thus ‘development’ took on a transitive 
meaning (an action performed by one agent upon another) which corresponded to a 
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principle of social organization, while ‘underdevelopment’ became a ‘naturally’ 
occurring (that is, seemingly causeless) state of things” (Rist 2014, 73). Beyond the 
semantic consequences, these commitments also shaped the ways one would view the 
geographies of the world. Contrary to the North-South relations structured on the 
colonizer/colonized dichotomy, the new ‘developed’/’underdeveloped’ division provided 
a new world paradigm. 
The “condition” of underdevelopment was the incomplete form of development, a 
process in history of growth that had not reached the desired destination. Even though 
this process would be added by outside agents, development was thought of as primarily 
“an internal, self-generated, self-dynamizing phenomenon, even if it could be ‘assisted’ 
from outside” (Rist 2014, 74). What was the result of employing this kind of rhetoric for 
the United States? First, it yielded a vocabulary that would justify the process of 
decolonization and allow the United States to deploy “a new anti-colonial imperialism” 
(Rist 2014, 75). Secondly, it justified the need for intervention as one could not respond 
to extreme need with passivity. The developed/underdeveloped dichotomy also neglected 
to take into account socio-political processes of poverty; it neglected the consideration of 
history defining poverty in terms of lack rather than the result of historical circumstances. 
Finally, the fourth point instilled the hegemony of the United States; national statistics 
and GDP measurements gained their rightful place in the absolute measurement of 
development and poverty (Rist 2014, 76). Within the system established by the global 
hegemon, decolonized countries remained bound not in their political space but in their 
economic autonomy (Rist 2014, 79).   
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Despite the political, historical beginnings of the development project, several 
scholars offer a different method of conceptualizing development. Martha Nussbaum 
proposes a different theoretical framework with which to approach the project of 
development. The “Human Development” paradigm, otherwise known as capability or 
capabilities approach, assesses the real opportunities people have “to be” and “to do” 
(Nussbaum 2013, 4). Moving toward this approach puts into question issues of inequality 
and questions of what constitute a quality life—something GDP measurements fail to do. 
Also striving to merge the fields of economics and philosophy, this paradigm is founded 
on the conception of human dignity and the worth of a human life. As such, its gives an 
embedded interpretation of the economy as directly linked with that of other fields such 
as philosophy, history and gender studies (Nussbaum 2013, 14). This entitlement or 
rights of individuals’ capabilities calls for positive liberty: the obligation of the state or 
government to ensure the creation and preservation of these capabilities. As noted by 
Nussbaum, “a society that does not guarantee these to all its citizens, at some appropriate 
threshold level, falls short of being a fully just society, whatever its level of opulence” 
(Nussbaum 2013, 7). That being said, Nussbaum lists the ten capabilities identified: life, 
bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical 
reasons, affiliation, other specifies, play and control over one’s environment (both 
political and material) (Nussbaum 2013, 7). Nussbaum also address the problems of 
cultural universalism problematizing the human development approach. As a point of 
counter-argument, she proposes that the capabilities are laid out in an abstract way, 
ensuring their own contextualization through state-society relations (Nussbaum 2013, 7).  
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In light with the capabilities approach, Amartya Sen provides an understanding of 
development that links to the concept of freedom or unfreedom. Thus, development as 
freedom means thinking in-terms of the capacity of individuals to “lead the kind of lives 
they value—and have reason to value” (Sen 1999, 18). Thus, overcoming the challenges 
of deprivation, oppression and destitution becomes part of the development project that 
strives to remove these unfreedoms. Sen further comments that the first step in countering 
contemporary problems of development is “to see individual freedom as a social 
commitment” (Sen 1999, xii).  Rather than looking at the growth of a country’s GDP, 
industrialization or social modernization (all of which can expand human freedom) to 
define the arrival point of development, he argues that development has to be viewed “as 
a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen 1999, 3). Thus, 
development means the removal or elimination of the sources of unfreedom: poverty as 
well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, 
neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states (Sen 
1999, 3). Once these constraints are lifted and social opportunities instituted, Sen argues, 
“individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other” (Sen 1999, 11; 
39-40).    
Conventional ideas of development as a universal and a module project have 
failed to take note of dynamic historical, cultural and social dynamics shaping different 
societies; this has yielded detrimental effects on peoples’ way of life. The critique of 
conventional development has taken many evaluative forms, including the above 
capabilities or freedom approach. However, there has been little discussion on the links 
between ethnicity and development. The rise in intra-state conflicts globally brings 
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scholars to evaluate the repercussions of mainstream development as it relates to ethnic 
conflicts. Seeking to reconcile the concepts of development and ethnicity, Scholars such 
as Rodolfo Stavenhagen and Bjorn Hettne propose the theory of ethnodevelopment. 
The Ethnodevelopment philosophy derives great inspiration from the alternative 
development paradigm. According to Stavenhagen, the idea behind ethnodevelopment 
entails: “an ethnie, whether indigenous, tribal, or any other, maintains control over its 
own land, resources, social organization, and culture” (Stavenhagen 1990, 90). This 
concept thus grants societies a level of agency to negotiate their own needs and demands 
with the state. Hettne further carries the conversation of ethnodevelopment, proposing 
that the “ethnic factor” needs to be given much attention and explored in light of 
development (Hettne 1990, 195). According to Hettne, ethnodevelopment is based upon 
four pivotal principles. These principles, proving compatible to ethnic peace, include 
cultural pluralism, internal self-determination, territorialism, and sustainability (Hettne 
1996, 24).  
As Hettne notes, conceptualization of culture from a pluralistic stance, rather than 
from a state-orientated hegemonic stance, acknowledges the diversity and the varying 
values and behavioral systems within the state (Hettne 1996, 24). In a concrete and 
practical sense, “It grants to the subnational cultural groups the right to use their own 
language, practice their religions and to carry out cultural practices forming part of their 
identity and socialization process” (Hettne 1996, 25). Key to the idea of cultural 
pluralism also entails the “indigenization of development” (Hettne 1990, 75). This refers 
to the process by which “ideas and institutions are more or less radically modified by the 
receivers to suit their own specific situation” (Hettne 1990, 74). In other words, local 
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knowledge because part of the development work approach.  The ethnodevelopment 
framework, through the concept of cultural pluralism, lends ethnic minorities and 
indigenous communities a level of agency that recognizes their voice in the negotiation 
process.  
The idea of cultural pluralism constitutes the first step to understand the different 
conceptions of development as specified by various groups within the state (Hettne 1996, 
30). These specificities and needs are thus articulated and further implemented through 
the political means of ethnodevelopment’s second pillar:  internal self-determination. The 
idea of territorialism upholds these essential culture-specific needs as it pertains to an 
ethnie’s connection to a particular place or habitat (Hettne 1996, 30).  Further elaborated 
upon by Mario Blaser, the idea of territorialism converges with vertical threads that 
constitute one-component life projects. Vertical threads of life projects recognize the 
importance of place-based history and memory that of a particular community’s way of 
life (Blaser 2004, 31). Hettne also rightly emphasizes the need for regionalism, critical in 
fighting “global forces of homogenization and ethnocide” (Hettne 1996, 30). I view the 
idea of regionalism as that encompassing the vision of a horizontal thread, of recognizing 
the translocality and spatiality of life projects (Blaser 2004, 31). Regionalism, Hettne 
argues, provides the larger framework to garner and implement tenants of 
ethnodevelopment (Hettne 1996, 30). Translocality offers not only a sense of protection 
but also a way of sharing knowledge and wisdom that broadens development 
perspectives. 
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Chapter III: Basic Information 
I. Physical Geography 	
The country of Ethiopia1 is located in the Horn of Africa bordered on the east by 
Somalia and Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north and Kenya 
to the south. It is a land locked country with an area of approximately 435,186 sq. miles. 
Its area is slightly less than twice the size of Texas. The country is marked with distinct 
and diverse topographic zones. Among the Ethiopian highlands and rugged mountains, 
Ras Dashan stands as its highest peak at 15,158 feet. The northern highlands are covered 
with hills and mountains that are flat-topped called amba (Markakis 2011, 24). The 
Somali Plateau is located just east of the Great Rift Valley and covers the southeastern 
section of Ethiopia. The Danakil Desert to the north reaches to the Red Sea and the 
country of Eritrea. Numerous river valleys criss-cross the highlands and on a larger scale 
and are divided by the Rift Valley running in a northest-southwest direction (Zewde 
1991, 2). The Rift Valley cuts across parts of East Africa including the countries of 
Kenya and Tanzania (Zewde 1991, 2). Other parts of Ethiopia’s highlands include the 
smaller southeastern highlands of Bale, Harar, Arsi and Sidamo; this subsides into the 
lowlands where the Oromo and the Somali people reside (Zewde 1991, 2).  
There are four major water systems that water the country. The first three rivers, 
Takkaze (Atbara), the Abbay (the Blue Nile) and Baro (Sobat in Sudan), flow westward 
into the Nile River. Lake Tana, located in the northwest region of Ethiopia, is the chief 
source of the Abbay River. The second group consists of Ganale and Wabe Shabale 
flowing toward the Indian Ocean. The Gibe River begins and ends in the south-western 																																																								1Greek in origin, the term “Ethiopia” was used as a general designation to describe the African landmass 
south of Egypt in classical times (Zewde 1991: 1).		
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highlands while the Awash sets off from the highlands west of the capital into the 
northeastern sands (Zewde 1991, 2). The Awash River is the only river that flows 
eastward in the country (Markakis 2011, 24).  
The southwest region of Ethiopia gets the heaviest dose of rain, due to the 
southwesterly nature of the wind movement (Zewde 1991, 4).  This has resulted in a 
“dense concentration of tropical broad-leaf forests” (Zewde 1991, 4). Despite the 
prevalence of deforestation, this area still accounts for 65 % of the country’s forest 
reserves. This region has also served as the primary bases for tradable goods, such as 
elephant tusk and coffee. In the northern region, intense human activity to sustain 
increasing human and animal population has led to cultivation practices that degraded the 
land (Markakis 2011, 26). Furthermore, the need for firewood, fencing and materials for 
building have resulted in deforestation in the northern and central parts of Ethiopia 
(Zewde 1991, 4).  
II. Political Geography   	
Ethiopia is defined by nine regional states and the two largest cities, in terms of 
population, are the chartered cities of Addis Ababa (3,273,000) and Nazret (324,000), the 
latter a robust transportation center and capital city of the Oromia regional state. Dire 
Dawa stands as the industrial center of the country with several key markets. The city of 
Mekele, located in the Tigray region, is Ethiopia’s principal economic and educational 
locale. 
III. Social Geography 	
The Abyssinian highlanders remain the oldest group with a long record of long-
lasting occupation and cultivation in the Horn of Africa (Markakis 2011, 25-26). Ethiopia 
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is home to a population of 91.73 million people, the second most populous country on the 
continent, after Nigeria. Ethiopia is composed of about 77 ethnic groups. The Oromo 
ethnic group, who live mostly in the southern highland periphery, make up approximately 
40% of the population. Approximately 32 % of the population is made of the Amhara and 
Tigrean ethnic groups and trace their roots to the ancient Abyssinian kingdom. The 
Sidamo people, representing 9% of the population, are situated in the southern foothills 
and savanna regions. Inhabiting the arid regions of the east and southeast are the Somalis 
and the Afars, making up 6% and 4% of the population approximately. While the Gurage 
make up 2% of the population, other people groups make up the remaining 1% of the 
population.  
According to Ethiopia’s Demographic Profile in 2014, about 43% of Ethiopians 
were reported as Orthodox Christians. Close to 34% of the population is reported to 
practice Islam, mostly situated in the regions of Oromia, Somali and Afar. Evangelical or 
Pentecostal Protestants make up about 20% of the population; Pentecostal Christianity is 
also the fastest growing religion in modern day Ethiopia. 2.6% of the population is 
reported as practicing traditional religions. The Falashas of Ethiopia practice a form of 
Judaism that traces its roots to ancient Arabian-Jewish or Egyptian-Jewish immigration; 
many of these individuals have suffered persecution and claim immigration to Israel.  
IV. Economy   	
Since the installment of the current EPRDF regime, the Ethiopian economy has 
progressively liberalized, although land remains in the hands of the government. 85% of 
the Ethiopian population is engaged in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. Within 
the agricultural sector, several commodities are produced: maize, sorghum, millet, other 
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cereals (barley, wheat, teff), tubers, and sugar cane. Coffee, chat, gold, leather products, 
and oilseeds are the countries largest exports. The manufacturing sector is largely 
centered in the city of Addis Ababa, with over 90% of large-scale industry owned by the 
state. While natural gas is found in the Ogaden region, other undeveloped natural 
resources, such as platinum, marble and copper, are also present. The Ethiopian economy 
has suffered from a “yoyo effect” of GDP growth due to weather patterns, drought and 
the dictates of international market.  
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Chapter IV: Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) 
I. Introduction 
  
The current boundaries of the Ethiopian state were formed under the leadership of 
Menelik II, the founding father of modern-day Ethiopia (Crummey 2000, 215). 
Previously the King of Shewa (1866-1889), by the turn of the century, he consolidated 
power to secure Ethiopia’s territorial sovereignty. During the 19th century, the area 
currently known as Ethiopia held a number of feudal nobilities, kingdoms and 
principalities (Hiwet 1975, 1). Following the end of Zemene Mesafint (Era of Princes), 
the need for a centralized state apparatus, with greater functional and territorial reach, 
became apparent (Hiwet 1975, 1). 
This chapter seeks to locate Ethiopia’s state-building project under his leadership. 
It also situates this project in the historical, colonial endeavors taking place in the Horn of 
Africa. Although the militarization and mobilization of the center was essential in 
guaranteeing Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, the internal expansion that accompanied 
these self-strengthening reforms were consequential. In particular, it forever changed how 
the center related to the populations in the periphery, thereby planting the seeds of future 
centrifugal challenges to the Ethiopian state. The system of taxation, the gult land-
allocation and the practice of slave trade were all crucial in building a state-apparatus that 
not only reinstated power at the centre but also marginalized conquered peoples in the 
periphery. This chapter will narrate state-building in the country through the interrelated 
processes of war-making, state-building, extraction and protection as expounded upon 
through the predatory theory. Drawing on the work of Polanyi, this discussion will also 
be supplemented by the social and cultural transformations that occupy national 
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articulation. Abyssinian political and cultural domination was critical in the making of 
the Ethiopian “nation-state.”  This chapter thus traces both external and internal dynamics 
that led to the Ethiopian state development.    
II. European Imperialism in the Horn  
 
The northern highlands of Ethiopia, consisting of the majority Amhara and Tigre 
ethnic groups, were known by European travelers as Abyssinia as early as the sixteenth 
century. The ancient territory of the Abyssinian kingdom comprised the current provinces 
of Tigre, Begemder, Gojjam, and part of Shoa and Wollo (Cohen & Weintraub 1975, 11). 
In the Southern and southwestern regions of Ethiopia, a number of people groups and 
Oromo kingdoms persisted with varying levels of political and social organization and 
evolution (Hiwet 1975, 1). These 19th century political and social organizations ranged 
from “primitive communal societies to states with powerful kings and elaborate 
mechanisms for the exercise of authority” (Zewde 1991, 16). Today’s provinces of 
Wollega, Hararge, Gemu Gotta, Bale, Arussi, Illubabor, Kaffa, and Sidamo, as well as 
parts of Shoa and Wollo were incorporated into the larger Abyssinian kingdom, 
constituting what is today the boundaries of the Ethiopian state (Cohen & Weintraub 
1975, 11). This internal consolidation and expansion took place in parallel with European 
colonial expansion in the region.  
Imperial contention for raw materials and resources began in earnest in the Horn 
with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Markakis 2011, 94). In the late 19th century, 
laissez-faire capitalism of the industrial revolution underwent a transformation to 
monopoly capitalism by which trade was controlled or concentrated in the hands of few 
individuals (Hiwet 1975, 2). This new phase of capitalism involved rapid accumulation, 
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centralization and internationalization of capital, destruction of the “petty manufacturer,” 
and the rise of the stock exchange through the increase in the activities of companies, 
cartels and trusts (Hiwet 1975, 2). This period of capitalist globalization marked the “big 
thinking” and performative nature of the free-market economy--of moving from “small 
scale petty commerce of imagined “tradition” to large-scale manufacturing” (Tsing 2009, 
154). The greater need for cheap, raw materials and agricultural produce, which called for 
a “bigness of production,” drove the scramble for colonies by European powers (Hiwet 
1975, 2 & Tsing 2009, 154).  
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed European imperialism and the 
international capitalist economy at Ethiopia’s frontiers (Crummey 2000, 226). This new 
era marks the critical moment of European intervention for territorial and economic gains 
that will transform the political economy and state-consolidation processes of the 
Ethiopian state-in-the-making. In particular, this will influence Menelik’s decision for 
southern expansion and conquest of southern peoples and regions. Although European 
interests in the region were multifaceted, the main driver of European scramble in the 
region was economic (Zewde 1991, 24). African markets were sought after to deal with 
the excessive production of industrial goods as the result of the industrial revolution in 
Europe (Zewde 1991, 24). In particular, Britain, France and Italy were all determined to 
seize raw goods and materials from the Horn (Markakis 2011, 94).  
European powers facilitated this process of extraction through the introduction of 
a certain type of state structure. They introduced centralized, state infrastructures in their 
colonies and relied on taxation and commerce to generate revenue (Crummey 2000, 227). 
To the west, the British controlled the Sudan; to the south, Kenya; and, to the northeast, 
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Somaliland (Crummey 2000, 226). Although the control of the headwaters of the Nile 
was the principal driver of British colonial policy in the region (i.e. Lake Victoria and 
Uganda), the British also pursued trade along the Baro from the Ethiopian port of 
Gambella (Crummey 2000, 226). This changed the political economy of the region, 
leading to parts of western and southwestern Ethiopia to become highly commercialized; 
due to such changes, the province of Wallaga, in particular, rose in economic importance 
(Crummey 2000, 227). This part of Ethiopia, a fertile ground for the supply of highly 
demanded international products, would prove essential in filling the coffers of the 
central state treasury under the emperor’s control. Through their skilled diplomacy, the 
French influenced the court of Menelik II: winning a concession to build a railroad 
linking the city of Addis Ababa to Djibouti (Crummey 2000, 226-227). Starting in 1917 
and following the next five decades, the railroad served as Ethiopia's main source of 
commercial trade and influence (Crummey 2000, 228). As Polanyi rightly notes, the 
commercialization of soil to meet international demands for trade facilitate internal 
articulation, as shown through the Ethiopian state-in-the-making.    
Although the three imperial powers had competing objectives for colonization, 
they were open to the possibility of joint action, as evidenced by the Tripartite Agreement 
signed by the three colonial powers (Crummey 2000, 226-227).  Britain's interest in the 
Nile Basin and France’s desire to control the railway zone were defined clearly (Zewde 
1991, 150-151). Although Italy’s intentions were shrouded with vague language, the 
country took the largest claim amongst the other colonial powers: northern region 
(Eritrea) and south-eastern region of Ethiopia (Somaliland). These European colonial 
encroachments posed existential threats and Ethiopia therefore expanded the effective 
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frontiers of the state to establish a buffer zone designed to protect the central and northern 
highlands. This process of incorporation of the periphery into the larger Abyssinian 
kingdom was thus occurring alongside European economic and territorial expansion in 
the region.  
III. Territorial and Cultural Expansion  
 
The acquisition of military aid from external actors, facilitated through deft 
diplomatic maneuvering, was instrumental in the consolidation of the boundary of the 
modern Ethiopian state. Congruent with the Tillyan perspective, territorial expansion also 
entailed securing resources that proved essential in building the Ethiopian state. As 
European powers intensified their colonial assaults in the territories of the Horn, Menelik 
II was aware that Ethiopia could also fall prey to colonization. He warned, “If Powers at a 
distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an 
indifferent spectator” (quoted in Hiwet 1975, 6). As the only ruling province excluded 
from the civil wars of the Era of Princes, the Shawan dynasty seized the power basis and 
eventually imperial throne (Markakis 2011, 90). Menelik II began his expansion project 
as a vassal of Emperor Yohannes and followed a pattern of territorial expansion that 
marked the Shawan dynasty (Zewde 1991, 60). The mid-nineteenth century saw the great 
expedition of Menelik II and his Abyssinian counterparts to incorporate peripheral lands 
into the core Abyssinian empire. This brought conquered territories into the political 
economy of the Ethiopian state-in-the-making and began the imposition of the high 
culture of the northern Abyssinian kingdom on conquered territories (Markakis 2011, 
98).                                        
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A strategic calculation went into conquering the lands in the periphery; 
incorporated territories were integrated through different methods and to varying degrees. 
This was based on the different levels of threat and benefits to political and economic 
state-consolidation. Forms of incorporation were judged based on categories such as 
religion, structure of indigenous subsistence production, ability to produce internationally 
tradable goods, and the territories strategic importance to the imperial state (Clapham 
2002, 13). Of these, Zewde notes that the desire to control long-distance trade was 
probably the most important consideration (Zewde 1991, 60). These motives prompted 
Gojamites and the Shewan forces to secure the Oromo Gibe region: “the green and lush 
Oromo lands and their boundless commodities (gold, civet, ivory, coffee) and the 
prosperous markets of Assenedbo (whose population swelled to 100,000 on market days), 
Embabo, Jimma and Billo” (Hiwet 1975, 4).   
The victory at the Battle of Embabo (1882) marked a critical moment for Menelik 
II to begin articulating the boundaries of the Ethiopian state internally and externally. He 
recognized the “external implications of his internal expansion” in light of the scramble 
for Africa that would take place shortly after (Zewde 1991, 61 & Hiwet 1975, 6). A 
month after his expedition in the South, he pronounced to the European world: “I am 
happy to be able to tell you that a long and hard campaign of seven months against the 
kingdoms...lying to the south and west of my dominions and masters of the route from 
Shewa to Kefa, has just permitted me to subject and render tributary the kings of Limmu, 
Gomma, Guma, Gera, and the Christian king of Kafa” (quoted in Hiwet 1975, 6). His 
announcement to European powers confirmed the fixed borders of the Ethiopian state-in-
the-making.  
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The Battle of Embabo made the south-west region vulnerable to Abyssinian 
conquest (Zewde 1991, 62). In this process of internal expansion and consolidation of 
central authority, Menelik eliminated enemies who resisted his rule or neutralized his 
enemies by integrating them into the empire-building project. The Oromo rulers Kumsa 
Moroda (later dajjazmach, and baptised Gabra-Egziabher) of Leqa Naqamte, Jote Tullu 
(also made dajjazmach) of Leqa Qellam, Abba Jifar II of Jimma, and the rulers of the 
other Gibe river states, such as Illubabor, further to the west surrendered to Menelik with 
“little to no resistance” (Zewde 1991, 62). The conquest of south-west Oromo region not 
only signified territorial expansion and consolidation for the Emperor but also allowed 
the Emperor to secure economic gain that would strengthen his political and military 
power (Zewde 1991, 62). In the Southern plateau, Shoan forces met fierce resistance 
from the Arsi Oromo. Arsi leaders Suffa Kuso and Damu Usu were willing to accept the 
offer of internal autonomy in return for the acknowledgement of Menelik’s suzerainty. 
However, the other clan chiefs and elders remained resistant to this exchange, offering 
levies from different clans in the region to muster an army against Menelik’s men (Zewde 
1991, 62). Although the fight marked an unequal struggle between arrows and firearms, 
the battles between Menelik’s army and Arsi fighters lasted for four years. The final 
conquest of Arsi opened the way for the seizing of the city-state and commercial center 
of Harar in 1887 (Markakis 2011, 90).  
As the incursion into Harar needed more sophisticated planning than the battle at 
Embabo, Menelik dispatched one of his spies, Asme Giyorgis, to secure inside 
information needed for the attack. In his assessment of European state formation, Tilly 
emphasizes the establishment of surveillance systems and forms of guaranteeing control 
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as key in the state building process. Disguised as a Muslim merchant, Asme collected 
data for three months on the city-state ranging from its “cultural life, economic 
conditions, number of dwellings, composition and size of population” (Hiwet 1975, 7). 
Menelik made a rationale for conquest, relaying to Italy a proposal for their co-scramble 
for Southern territories: “Italy was to occupy Zeila and Berbera, and Minilik was to 
occupy Harar” (Hiwet 1975, 8). Two months later, he expressed his intentions of 
annexing all of the territory mentioned above (Hiwet 1975, 8). Menelik led his men of 
20,000 against the emir of Harar, commanding no more than 4,000 men. The victory at 
the Battle of Chelenqo, January 6, 1887, marked the opening of Harar to the exploitive 
Shewan domination. After securing the imperial throne in 1889, Menelik commanded 
forces from other Christian provinces to continue his Southward expansion. This was 
briefly checked by the Italian invasion from the north, which resulted in the Battle of 
Adwa (1896).  
Through methods of forced incorporation and concessions, land in the periphery 
became articulated into the larger Abyssinian kingdom. Territorial expansionism was 
embedded within the tripartite process of what Donham (1986, 11) calls 
Abyssinianization: rist land-tenure system, the establishment of Amharic as a dominant 
language and the proliferation and expansion of the Orthodox Christian Church. The 
latter two were critical in sustaining the cultural and political hegemony of the 
Abyssinian kingdom and the religious traditions of the northern, Semitic-speaking 
peoples while the previous instigated the systematic practice of extraction.  The “Great 
Tradition” of the Abyssinian kingdom, as it expanded southward, defined the national 
history of Ethiopia at the cost of the historical, social and economic subjugation of 
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colonized areas. The set of Abyssinian ideologies and attitudes, coupled with the 
Orthodox religious institution and the Amharic language, served a self-legitimizing 
purpose that defined the northern peoples as more civilized than their southern neighbors 
(Clapham 2002, 11). Having their cultures and traditions condemned to second class 
status, conquered peoples in the south could only enter into the political and social life of 
the defined Ethiopian state through adopting the lingua franca of Menelik’s empire and 
through conversion to Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity (Marcus 1995, 2). Furthermore, 
the Emperor used the method of name changes to Amharic to reinforce Abyssinian 
hegemony. This forced an identity on conquered peoples that would erase their historical 
lineage and cultural traditions. Their collective lives would now become narrated through 
the ‘greater’ Ethiopian ‘national’ narrative that was only defined by Abyssinian customs 
and traditions.  
IV. Militarization and Internal Legitimacy  
 
 Territorial and cultural expansion gave Menelik and his men the means to engage 
in external war making. In the Tillyan typology, war-making involves the capacity to 
fight against outside intruders by securing a monopoly over the means of coercion. In the 
Ethiopia case, this process was facilitated by Menelik II’s keen ability to secure modern 
weaponry from European powers. By playing the colonizing powers against each other, 
Abyssinian leaders secured modern weaponry and ammunition (Markakis 2011, 92). 
Against Britain's arms embargo imposed on Ethiopia, France and Italy allowed Menelik 
to secure sophisticated firearms. Ironically, the same rifles and fieldpieces Italy granted to 
the Abyssinians as a sign of cordial friendship would later be used against them at the 
battlefield of Adwa (1896).  During the Battle of Adwa, the Ethiopian force of 100,000 
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annihilated Italy’s army of 20,000 (Hiwet 1975, 12). Among Ethiopia’s 100,000 men, 
“80,000 were armed with rifles, while there were nearly 9,000 cavalry as well as 42 
artillery and machine-gun batteries” (Hiwet 1975, 12). The rest of the men carried all 
types of weaponry, ranging from swords and lances to spears (Hiwet 1975, 12), equipped 
by all possible means to ward off Italian intrusion. The fight put up by the Ethiopians was 
no “primitive” warfare but the result of state building: “Unlike the rest of the continent, 
European imperialism met its match in this corner of Africa” (Markakis 2011, 3).  
The building of an Ethiopian army was precipitated by the precarious security 
threat posed by imperial powers: “By the turn of the twentieth century, Menelik’s army 
consisted of approximately six hundred thousand riflemen and innumerable traditionally 
armed warriors” (quoted in Keller 1988, 37). Before securing the throne as emperor of 
Ethiopia, Menelik also invited foreign officials, mostly French and Russians, to instruct 
Ethiopian soldiers in the use of modern weaponry (Keller 1988, 37). During his rule, 
Menelik introduced two dominant features that contributed to the state-making process: a 
standing army and salary payment for soldiers (quoted in Keller 1988, 38). Despite the 
efforts of the emperor to professionalize the army in lieu of European military 
organization and strategies, many traditional patterns and organizations persisted (Keller 
1988, 38).  
Congruent with Tilly’s core logic, this organizational feature of the Ethiopian-
state-in-the making was critical in eliminating a powerful external enemy. Furthermore, 
Ethiopia’s relations with European powers during the time of Africa’s colonization and 
its victory over Italy planted seeds of legitimization for Ethiopia’s state-formation 
process. As Clapham (2002, 11) rightly notes, Ethiopia benefited from the “the norm of 
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sovereignty” and gained a level of recognition for statehood through displaying its ability 
to secure modern weaponry (Clapham 2002, 11). In other words, the emperor’s ability to 
negotiate with European powers articulated the state to outside powers and thus, 
legitimated the notion of fixed Ethiopian borders. Furthermore, there was a racial 
dimension to the battle that gave the victory at Adwa great significance: “It was a victory 
of blacks over whites” (Zewde 1991, 81). As Ethiopia symbolized hope and 
independence, Blacks all over the world rallied around this victory and gained great 
inspiration to fight against white domination. The Ethiopian state gained a level of 
legitimacy through such Black solidarity. In addition, the Addis Ababa Treaty, signed 
after the Battle of Adwa, affirmed Ethiopia’s independence and territorial sovereignty. 
Through the treaty, the northern frontiers of Menelik’s empire were clearly defined 
(Hiwet 1975, 12), but Ethiopia lost access to the sea through the creation of the colonial 
state of Eritrea (Crummey 2000, 226).  
Although the victory at Adwa guaranteed a level of international recognition and 
legitimacy, Menelik II had to think about how to further secure and stabilize his rule. In 
the Tillyan perspective, protection involves securing allies internally and providing 
protection for domestic players and chief supporters of the empire; this facilitates the 
guaranteeing of internal legitimacy. Similar to the European experience of local magnate 
installment to rule different provinces, the Ethiopian example, in particular, confirm the 
important role of indirect rulers in state-consolidation. In Ethiopia, indirect rulers who 
occupied intermediate positions were crucial in securing Abyssinian power in the 
periphery. While assimilating to the dominant culture of the Abyssinians, local balabbats 
(indigenous elites who were subordinate to the lowest neftegna) served as social bridges 
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linking the imperial state to local inhabitants (Crummey 2000, 225). They proved crucial 
in the extraction process and transferring of capital to the centre and provided a protected 
provincial ruling structure: “Rulers of empires generally sought to co-opt regional and 
local powerholders without utterly transforming their bases of power, and to create a 
distinctive corps of royal servants...whose fate depended on that of the crown” (quoted in 
Markakis 2011, 110) They carried out functions of the state such as “maintaining law and 
order, reporting crimes and apprehending perpetrators, hearing disputes and 
administering traditional justice, as well as assessing and collecting taxes.” (Markakis 
2011, 110) Furthermore, the balabbats were rewarded and transformed to a land-owning 
class themselves; they also usually retained a tenth of the state tax (Markakis 2011, 110). 
This allowed them to secure a higher status in the newly engineered socio-economic 
hierarchy (Markakis 1973, 364). 
For some, submission to Abyssinian powers led to “assimilation into the 
Abyssinian ruling class, and even links with the royal household” (Markakis 2011, 95). In 
regions such as Wellegga and Tigray, marriage with the imperial family provided the 
linkage of indigenous rulers to the imperial family. Places like Jimma, which held vast 
Muslim population, were excluded from marriage prospects (Clapham 2002, 13). The 
political nature of marriage prospects signals the cultural and social landscape that 
underlined Abyssinian cultural and religious domination. Menelik used both indigenous 
intermediaries and transplanted Abyssinians to rule the incorporated territories (Markakis 
2011, 4). Amhara and Tigrean naftannas, the Orthodox church and balabbats (subjected 
themselves to political and cultural assimilation) aided in the development of the 
Ethiopian “nation” defined under predominantly Amhara hegemony (Marcus 1995, 2). 
	 66	
The particular use of armed retainers and churchmen by the Ethiopian state echoes that of 
the European experience. 
V. Taxation, the Gult System and Slave Trade  
 
A key component of the process of state-formation is the process of extraction or 
capital accumulation. Extraction allows the leaders to garner human and material capital 
to further guarantee a centralized state apparatus. In Ethiopia’s state-building process, 
this is evident in the areas of taxation and law. In the 1890s, Menelik II instituted several 
national levies, i.e. the agricultural tithe, and constructed a centralized department of 
taxation for revenue collection throughout the regions: “No longer could provincial 
administrators arbitrarily forward the minimum acceptable amount to Addis Ababa; they 
had now to justify their receipts and render a full accounting” (Marcus 1995, 3). Taxes 
were commonly levied after conquering a particular land and in preparation for an 
upcoming external war. After securing the city-state of Harrar, for example, the emperor 
imposed a compensation cost of 10,000 Maria Tereza dollars to be collected from each 
gate of Harar (Hiwet 1975, 8).  In the fight against Italy in the late 19th century, the 
emperor would impose a special tax to pay for the importation of 100,000 carbines 
(Markakis 2011, 92). Taxation was also purposed to build a national economy that linked 
the centralized, state apparatus to the social and commercial developments of provincial 
hamlets (Marcus 1995, 3). Based on the Tillyan account, taxation is also crucial in 
channeling peasant production into the international market.  
After the subjugation of the Southern region of Ethiopia, the building of the 
Ethiopian empire was further facilitated through the importation of the gult land system. 
This system entailed “the parceling out of the conquered lands and peoples in tributary 
	 67	
relationships to the groups and individuals who conquered them” (Crummey 2000, 229). 
This land tenure policy primarily functioned to reward or to support Menelik’s military 
forces. To exploit the resources of the conquered lands remained a priority, as it proved 
the only way to pay the soldiery and to maintain the imperial treasury (Markakis 2011, 
97). Military garrisons or rifleman, named naftannas, were crucial in keeping peace and 
security within the newly colonized spaces. The “ethos” of the gult system became for 
Menelik's men “to eat” the land (quoted in Markakis 2011, 97). The new garrisons that 
occupied the south were supported through the tributary relationship between the new 
settlers and the gebbars (Crummey 2000, 223). Furthermore, the rank of the garrisons 
determined the number of gebbars they received; while a commander might receive a 
hundred, a private might get less than five (Crummey 2000, 223). Through such 
economic exploitation and social stratification, the Abyssinian rulers defined their upper 
class status and secured their rule in the periphery.   
The presence of ketemas (garrison towns) also became crucial for the greater 
security of the Imperial authority within the provincial regions. These garrison towns 
were erected throughout Ethiopia’s vast territory but were most apparent in the southern 
regions (Keller 1988, 39). Menelik dispatched his “watchmen” or soldiers for the 
administration of conquered territories and to mitigate any uprisings in the regions 
(Keller 1988, 39). Where these men were present, they also worked to reinforce 
Abyssinian cultural hegemony. Compared with the naftannas, “The subject peoples in the 
empire were generally seen as primitive, without culture or effective government, and 
lazy, dirty, and warlike: they were naked or dressed in skins; they were heathen who 
needed the word of God” (Marcus 1975, 193). If a particular soldier had an offspring by a 
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southern woman, the northern wife would often adopt the child into her household to 
raise him in Abyssinian culture (Marcus 1975, 194). As part of this assimilation process, 
the status of an Oromo woman was enhanced through becoming mistresses for a 
northerner (Marcus 1975, 194). These, among many, serve as examples by which 
Abyssinian culture instated its hegemony, relegating all other peoples are subordinate and 
backwards.    
Further, the military garrisons played a central role in developing Ethiopia’s 
centralized state apparatus and bureaucratic authority. Trusted generals were given 
important posts such as governor-general of different provinces (Keller 1988, 38). The 
installment of these men proved crucial in securing successful submission of new 
territories. This would later prove a challenge as the presence of naftannas “blocked the 
state access to local tribute and the producers’ access to economic opportunity” 
(Crummey 2000, 229). In other words, the naftannas often failed to pass on the large 
majority of the tributes received from their tributaries, thereby blocking the transfer of 
wealth to the imperial state  (Crummey 2000, 224). Consequently, the state pursued its 
own land-owning objectives through the measurement of land under the qalad (rope) 
system. This made the state not only a distributor of land but also a major claimant in the 
process of land allocation. Congruent with Tilly’s thesis, practices of revenue collection 
and the gult land-tenure system functioned as extractive mechanisms that facilitated the 
building of a more centralized, Ethiopian state.  
With the naftanna-gebbar system, members of the conquered people became 
tillers and servants on their own land. They were forced to surrender their production to 
the soldiers, the Crown and The Ethiopian Orthodox Church (Lata 1999, 156). Although 
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the gult system did persist in the northern highlands previously, the system reflected a 
new socio-economic dimensions that evidenced “subordination and inferiority of status” 
in the conquered regions (Crummey 2000, 223). The nature of the gult system was also 
transformed, particularly in the southern regions, through the introduction of the railroad 
in 1917. Certain commodities drove the commercial exports from the highlands: skins, 
hides and coffee. While skin and hides were the products of Ethiopia’s agrarian and 
pastoral society, the second was key in allotting new value and importance to land. As 
Crummey writes, “ [Coffee] gave new value to land and reinforced efforts by the state to 
break down the social relations which it had, itself, originally put in place” (Crummey 
2000, 230). This confirms Polanyi's discussion on the social and cultural transformations 
produced by the free-market system.  In places such as Sidamo, Gedeo and Wallaga, 
coffee growing increased rapidly.  Gult was particularly converted from “direct 
appropriation of labor toward tribute based on agricultural production” (Crummey 2000, 
230). The railroad itself was also a great force of change. More lands were brought into 
the Ethiopian empire and the holders of the lands now got the opportunities to grow and 
to export coffee, becoming part of the larger economy of the Ethiopian empire and the 
global market. For the first time in the history of Ethiopia, western manufactured 
products were also made available through the railroad. This gave new value to cash that 
previously did not exist (Crummey 2000, 230)  
Another common form of extraction during this period was Ethiopia’s 
involvement in the slave trade. Menelik is noted in history as “Ethiopia’s greatest slave 
entrepreneur” (Marcus 1995, 73). Menelik and his wife reportedly owned 70,000 slaves 
(Markakis 201l, 97). This was also common among some of the indigenous elites who 
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served as intermediaries on behalf of the state. Aba Jiffar of Jimma reportedly had 10,000 
slaves (Markakis 2011, 97). Menelik led slaving expeditions (razzia) around the 
conquered areas. His heir presumptive, Lij Yasu, forcefully dragged about 40,000 Dizi 
slaves to the city of Addis Ababa; almost half did not make the journey alive (Zewde 
1991, 93). Both goods from the south-west and slaves were used for exchange to garner 
modern weapons (Marcus 1995, 73). 
The practices of extraction were key in processes of power consolidation by the 
Abyssinian empire. This occurred through political, economic and social processes that 
were embedded in practice. The cultural and economic landscape was transformed 
through an extractive economy that formed hegemonic institutions that dictated social 
class formations. Subordination, cultural annihilation and poverty became the products of 
policies pursued in the southern regions (Crummey 2000, 225).  The superimposition of a 
supposedly high Abyssinian culture with its “Amharic speech, Christian religion, 
distinctive dress, and a refined cuisine” displaced the historical and social roots of its 
inhabitants (Crummey 2000, 225). Land alienation and dispossession not only created 
divisions that intensified ethnic and religious differences. They also created class 
divisions and social hierarchies based on property ownership and cultural superiority. 
Practice of the gult land-tenure system and Ethiopia’s slave trade rightly characterize the 
commodification of man and nature. This occurred within the larger framework of a 
capitalist, exploitative economy brought upon by European imperialism in the region. 
This also affected the cultural political economy of the Ethiopian state in the making, 
leading to the internal colonial practices of the Abyssinian counterparts.    
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VI. Education and Centralization  
 
 Tilly notes that the building of educational institutions served to solidify state 
infrastructure. This is particularly shown in the modernizing adventures of Menelik II. 
The Emperor strived to modernize the state through the expansion of education. This 
provided further support for strengthening the country’s knowledge economy and 
undertake the process of modernization. The intensified relations with Europe after the 
Battle of Adwa in 1896 provided more educational opportunities for Ethiopians (Zewde 
1991, 103).  The new intelligentsia, with French as its new lingua franca, proved critical 
for the expanded state infrastructure: “The expansion of the state apparatus...made the 
training of a cadre of officials imperative” (Zewde 1991, 104). Some of these educated 
men would later serve as radical voices for the marginalized communities of the 
Ethiopian state (Zewde 1991, 104). Missionaries sponsored most of the first educated 
Ethiopians; men such as Kantiba (Mayor) Gabru Dasta of Gondar region and Onesimus 
Nasib of Wallaga, served their respective peoples through increasing literacy and 
educational opportunities. Education was also a site of struggle for the state seeking to 
balance both elements of tradition and modernity. This is evidenced through the 
introduction of Menelik II School in 1908. The staff was made up of Egyptians of the 
Orthodox Coptic Christian Church: “It was felt that the Copts would filter down to their 
pupils a tempered version of modern ideas” (Zewde 1991, 108). The ministry of 
education, although it did not function as an independent entity, developed alongside the 
office of the archbishop (Zewde 1991, 109). Modern education provided both skilled 
individuals for the state apparatus and facilitated the “dissemination of ideas and change” 
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(Zewde 1991, 109). The place of the Church in educational institutions was also a way to 
sustain Abyssinian religious tradition. 
 According to Tilly’s argument, war-making and the processes of extraction and 
protection facilitates institutional development and centralization. In 1907, Menelik 
announced his consideration to create cabinet members to the outside world (Keller 1988, 
40). Similar to European cabinet formation, Menelik appointed nine ministers in the 
office: ministers of justice, war, interior, commerce and foreign affairs, finance, 
agriculture, public works, and the ministers of the court and of the pen (quoted in Keller 
1988, 40). The minister of the Pen acted as the emperor’s “chief secretary, archivist, and 
chronicler” (Marcus 1975, 228). Menelik did not select rich aristocrats or prominent men 
to these posts; instead, he was keen in selecting those who displayed loyalty to him and 
would thus strengthen his ultimate authority (Keller 1988, 40 & Marcus 1975, 228). 
Despite his little reliance on their expertise, these posts signified the development of a 
“secularized central bureaucracy” (Keller 1988, 40). Both the ministers and employees of 
the ministers were paid salaries directly from the emperor’s treasury (Keller 1988, 40).  
Menelik sought to obtain both domestic control and international legitimacy 
through establishing important policies around money and banking. Ethiopia began to 
mint its own currency, the first becoming minted in Paris (Keller 1988, 40). This 
currency did not gain much acceptance at home or abroad in competition with the 
Austrian Maria Theresa dollar (Keller 1988, 40). Another monetary policy proposed by 
Menelik was the establishment of a national bank. Initiated by foreign capital, the Bank 
of Abyssinia was established as an affiliate of the Egyptian bank (Keller 1988, 40). The 
bank was tasked “to provide banking services in Ethiopia, produce and issue coins and 
	 73	
notes, set up bonded warehouses, assume custody of all money belonging to the state, and 
receive preferential rights to all state loans” (quoted in Keller 1988, 40-41). These 
financial institutions were crucial in centralizing the empire and garnering control over 
the internal activities of the state.  
 There were also other features of the state such as the building of railroad, postal 
services, telegraph and telephone operations, roads, bridges and hospitals that began to 
articulate the state as an institution. These new infrastructures served to facilitate the 
extraction process from the distant provinces and strengthened the viability of a 
centralized Ethiopian state (Keller 1988, 41). Innovations around communications 
allowed the emperor to reinstate “rapid communication with the outside world and 
facilitated administration and the dissemination of information within the country” 
(Marcus 1975, 200).  Infrastructures such as roads were vital for the transport of troops 
and administrators while also providing the means to transport capital and human slaves 
that “produced the wealth needed to swell the imperial coffers” (Keller 1988, 41). Most 
importantly, these innovations provided a way for the emperor to legitimize his rule and 
secure his dominion over the Ethiopian state.       
VII. Conclusion 
 
 The Tillyan perspective shows the importance of war as the primary motor for 
institutional development. The case-study on Ethiopia reveals the relevance of predatory 
theory in the country’s state formation process. Through the interlinked processes of war-
making and state-making, the Ethiopian state mustered a sizeable army to protect the 
state from both global and local opposition. Furthermore, Abyssinian rulers devised a 
scheme to secure modern weaponry from European powers used to defeat Italy and 
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conquer the lands in the periphery. Polanyi's work on the implications of the free-market, 
resulting in the commodification of human life and nature, also sheds light on the 
extractive means by which capital accumulation became a reality. The examples of the 
gult land-tenure system, the introduction of the railroad and the practice of slave trade 
serve as Ethiopia’s examples by which the economy subordinates political and social life 
to free-market mechanism.  
Furthermore, assessment of the cultural landscape of Ethiopia’s political economy 
confirms the embedded ways Abyssinian high culture and tradition defines the Ethiopian 
state-in-the-making. The installation of Amharic as the national lingua franca, marriages 
into the imperial throne, name changes to Abyssinian counterparts and the influence of 
the Coptic Church in educational institutions all display the social underpinnings of 
Ethiopia’s ‘national’ articulation. Two dominant themes, which appear in this historical 
period but become more apparent in later periods of Ethiopian history, are that of 
modernization and development. The next chapter traces the process of state building 
under the leadership of Haile Selassie I.  
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Chapter V: Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930-1974) 
I. Introduction  
 
Although the process of centralizing the state began with Menelik, Emperor Haile 
Selassie expanded on it, building on Menelik's legacy of state centralization and power 
consolidation. With greater force, the feudal-like society of Ethiopia embarked on the 
journey to modernization. The Emperor focused on solidifying the state, garnering a level 
of legitimacy both domestically and internationally and creating a more bureaucratic state 
apparatus; these efforts signaled a move toward promoting stability and unity within the 
country (Keller 1988, 67). There were several and distinct developments that 
characterized the state-building project in Ethiopia during the time of the Emperor; the 
project of development was undertaken with greater zeal after WWII.   
In this chapter, I explore the different developments that characterized state-
consolidation during the Emperor’s time. Key to my analysis is the contradictions 
between modernity and tradition that complicate the state-building endeavor. The first 
section will briefly document the ascension of Emperor Haile Selassie and highlight some 
of his achievement while serving as Regent. The second section will look at political 
developments, focusing on the creation of the first Ethiopian constitution and the use of 
an educated body of civil servants used for state-centralization. The following sections 
will assess themes that are relevant to power and legitimacy both in the domestic and 
international scene. 
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II. Ascension to the Throne  
  
Emperor Haile Selassie, Tafari Mekonen until his ascent to power in 1930, was 
the son of Menelik’s cousin Ras Makonnen. Makonnen was a close companion of 
Menelik II and governor of the province of Harar until his death in 1906. The Emperor’s 
claim to the throne came from Makonnen’s lineage, which extended to King Sahle-
Selassie of Shoa. Tafari was born in the province of Harar in 1892 and was appointed as 
governor at the age of seventeen, adopting the title Ras Tafari Mekonen. At a very young 
age, he proved competent in asserting his rule and managing divisive politics with 
calculation (Clapham 2015, 184). After the passing of Menelik II, his grandson, Iyasu, 
was named Emperor. However, his legitimacy was undermined due to his unfavorable 
status as a “a serial womanizer and secret covert to Islam” (Clapham 2015, 184). Iyasu’s 
particular association with Islam posed a threat to Haile Selassie, as he was the governor 
over an area that held a majority Muslim population. In 1916, Iyasu removed Haile 
Selassie from his post, relocating him to the wealthy province of Kaffa in the south-west 
(Clapham 2015, 184). Tafari remained behind the scene for the coup d’état to follow 
which removed Iyasu from the throne in September of 1916. This brought Menelik II’s 
daughter, Zewditu, to the throne as empress and Tafari as Regent and heir to the throne. 
The following decade were marked with power struggles in the centre that also reflected 
the struggle between philosophical orders of tradition and modernity. While Tafari 
presented himself as “the leader of the modernizing forces in Ethiopia,” his main 
challenger Minister of War, Fitawrari Habte-Giyorgis, remained the traditionalist 
opponent. In 1930, Tafari rose as powerful and unchallenged leader (Clapham 2015, 
185).  
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III. Work as Regent: Domestic and International Policy 
 
During his Regency, Tafari enacted policies that would lead the country of 
Ethiopia on the path of modernization. These policies were evident both in the domestic 
and international arenas. In the domestic scene, the Regent focused on the area of 
education and the building of Ethiopia’s knowledge economy. A department of education 
was founded in 1906 and was raised to ministry level in 1930. In 1925, he also opened a 
school for the sons of nobility. Prior to his time, elementary education was mostly the 
function of the Church (Markakis 2011, 110).  Taking part in the modernization project, 
Tafari’s wife sponsored the opening of a school for girls. Another school, Medhane Alem, 
was founded for the children of balabbats in the capital city of Addis Ababa while other 
notables founded other schools in the provincial towns (Markakis 2011, 110).   
As a Regent, Tafari made great strides to bring Ethiopia to the world scene. One 
important initiative he took was seeking entrance into the League of Nations in 1923. 
This marked Ethiopia’s acceptance into the community of nations as an equal player, 
with the required ban on slavery (Clapham 2015, 185). One year later, Tafari embarked 
on a diplomatic trip with tours around Europe (Italy, France and the United Kingdom) 
and the Middle East. To further protect his position and rule while abroad, Tafari took 
with him a group of advisors and prominent provincial rulers such as Ras Haylu and Ras 
Seyoum (Clapham 2015, 185). On their visits, these men took notes on the modern 
features that characterized the places they visited; in other words, they remained 
observant to elements of other places and cultures they could adopt to their own. 
Although Tafari was unable to secure Ethiopia’s unlimited access to the sea, he was able 
to block the Anglo-Italian accord, which, without the consent of Ethiopia, sought to 
	 78	
reinstate British and Italian sphere of dominion in the country (Clapham 2015, 185-
186).   
IV. The Constitution and Legitimacy 
 
During his time as Emperor, Haile Selassie modernized the political structure of 
the Ethiopian state. To the outside world, the biggest achievement of the Emperor was the 
establishment of a constitution and a body of civil servants; these, also, were ways to 
further solidify his own ultimate power. The first Ethiopian constitution was drafted in 
July 1931, modeled to some extent after the Japanese constitution. This was revised in 
1955, twenty-four years later. Both at home and abroad, the constitution was to show the 
Emperor as an “enlightened and reforming ruler” (Clapham 1969, 34). Drafted by the 
foreign-educated and leading intellectual of the time, Minister of Finance Bajerond 
Takla-Hawariyat, the document was supposed to showcase the centralizing ethos of the 
imperial government and display the secure and sturdy constitutional foundation upon 
which the emperor’s reign was based. Furthermore, the constitution functioned as a 
signaling device to communicate the trappings of a modern state capable of integrating 
into the larger body of states: “it was intended to create a modern facade for the absolute 
monarchy that Haile Selassie was fashioning” (Markakis 2011, 109). Although the 
constitution functioned to signal legitimacy, it remained evidence that “constitutional 
monarchy was an illusion” (Prunier & Ficquet 2015, 9).   
The constitution established the supremacy of the Emperor: “In the Ethiopian 
Empire supreme power rests in the hands of the Emperor. He ensures the exercise thereof 
in conformity with the abolished law” (Chapter II, Article 6). The constitution further 
prepared the grounds for a bureaucratized state, consisting of judiciary and budgetary 
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institutions. The Emperor’s ascendency from the Solomonic legend and his ultimate rule 
and honor due to him were defined in the constitution:  “By virtue of His Imperial Blood, 
as well as by the anointing which He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, 
His dignity is inviolable and His power indisputable. Consequently, He is entitled to all 
the honours due to Him in accordance with tradition and the present constitution. The 
Law decrees that anyone so bold as to injure the Majesty of the Emperor will be 
punished” (quoted in Perham 1969, 427). The constitution once again reaffirmed the 
emperor’s alleged Solomonic roots, and solidified his role as the final arbiter of all things 
Ethiopia, thereby exempting the emperor from the requirements of having to derive his 
legitimacy from the consent of the governed.  In short, the constitution, rather than 
serving a framework within which the emperor’s reign could be legitimized, instead 
served a different purpose: to shield the emperor from accountability by solidifying his 
dynastic legitimacy.   
The most innovative achievement of the constitution was the creation of two 
legislative bodies: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Keller 1988, 70). Although 
giving the illusion of a democratic reform which would place these legislative bodies at 
the centre of law-making, the Constitution made clear that they were only responsible for 
advising the Emperor; thus, the power for decision making was vested in Emperor’s 
sovereignty. The facade of power-sharing was an appeal to the educated class, which held 
a disposition for change. The Emperor appointed Senators from the local nobility and 
chiefs; these senators would in-turn elect the deputies. The vision was for this system of 
election to evolve into participatory democracy by the subjects when “they were prepared 
to accept this weighty participatory responsibility” (Keller 1988, 70). 
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The sovereign reign of the Emperor, as enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution, 
was further vaguely articulated through Church documents such as the Kebra Nagast and 
the Fetha Nagast (Keller 1988, 69). These documents legitimized the Emperor’s ancestry 
as tracing back to King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. The Emperor was thus 
“declared divinely ordained, and his successors could come only from the royal 
Solomonic line” (Keller 1988, 69). The traditional and legitimate function of the Church 
was being co-opted by a secular constitution that reinstated the Emperor’s reign and his 
successive rule in the empire. This trend toward secularization was generally regarded as 
a move toward modernity (Keller 1988, 70).  
The constitution was amended in 1955 on the occasion of the Emperor’s silver 
jubilee. This was also designed to showcase Ethiopia’s progress and align with the far 
more advanced elements of the Eritrean constitution (Ethiopia had now formed a 
federation with Eritrea) (Markakis 2011, 117).  The drafting committee consisted of three 
American advisers and two leading Ethiopian intellectuals: Walda-Giyorgis Walda-
Yohannes and Aklilu Habta-Wald. Contrary to the stated commitment to change, “Even 
more than its 1931 predecessor, the Revised Constitution of 1955 was a legal charter for 
the consolidation of absolutism” (Zewde 1991, 206). As noted by John Spencer, one of 
the American officials present at the drafting, the constitution “was a screen beyond 
which conservative positions could be entrenched” (quoted in Zewde 1991, 206). 
Appealing to subjects as a modernized, democratic form, the amendment spelt out human 
rights standards such as freedom of speech and of the press. These lofty goals, however, 
were undermined by limitations of the law, which again upheld the supremacy of the 
Emperor.  
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Two modern institutions were introduced in the amended version of the revised 
constitution: universal adult suffrage and provisions for an elected Chamber of Deputies 
(Zewde 1991, 207). Although these indicated a break from the past, they proved only of 
marginal significance. Class bias of the deputies was evident in the property qualification 
for election and once elected, these men did not prove champions for innovation and 
change. As Markakis notes, “The introduction of elections for the Chamber of Deputies 
on the basis of universal adult suffrage was a purely cosmetic gesture, while the Senate 
remained an appointed chamber reserved for retired nobles and high officials” (Markakis 
2011, 117). Therefore, Parliament functioned as an arena for self-promotion, rather than 
for popular representation (Zewde 1991, 207).      
Although the constitution signified democratic pretense, there remained a move 
toward secularization and modernization of government bureaucracy. The Emperor 
employed Ethiopians educated abroad to fulfill the duties of state function.  During the 
time of Menelik II, few individuals went abroad to seek educational opportunities. Haile 
Selassie sought people who were foreign educated and could help him in consolidating 
his empire. These people held both knowledge and linguistic assets that could be utilized 
to further communicate the state to outside powers. This recruitment for the state allowed 
the Emperor “to balance the influence of the traditional Abyssinian elite without creating 
a threat to his own power” (Markakis 2011, 110). The nobility at that time had little 
interest in modern education; consequently the majority of the first generation of 
educated Ethiopians had humble social origins and owed their rise to their own efforts 
and royal favour. The emperor “ ‘raised them from the dust’, the people said” (Markakis 
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2011, 110). In a way, the Emperor sought to create a system of personal indebtedness that 
would further legitimize his reign and secure faithful supporters. 
The Emperor secured power and further solidified the protective and the 
regulatory capacities of the state strengthened through the professionalization of the 
Ethiopian army. With the opening of a military academy in 1934, The Emperor sought 
after foreign officers, often Swedish, for training of the Ethiopian recruits. For his own 
protection, the Emperor also devised a military unit, the Imperial Guard, who were 
trained by Belgian officials to protect the ruler (Keller 1988, 72). These proved an 
alternative source of protection in the case that the army itself posed any challenge to his 
rule and authority (Keller 1988, 72).  
V. The Domestic Setting and Modernization 
  
Foreign advisors had a critical role to play in the modernization projects carried 
out by the Emperor. Addis Ababa at the time was bombarded with diplomats, merchants 
and concession seekers; much of whom the Emperor viewed with skepticism. However, 
much of the innovations introduced were the result of negotiations with these foreign 
powers.  The Emperor was able to “introduce such innovations as a national currency, a 
state bank, a postal, telephone and telegraph system, and the training of Ethiopian 
soldiers in the use of modern weapons” (Markakis 2011, 109). New tax regulations and a 
new currency, issued in year 1933, facilitated the process of state building in Ethiopia.  
The Emperor identified trade as a vital source of national growth and revenue. 
The Emperor’s advisers urged him to further centralize customs collection in the 
peripheralized provinces (Markakis 2011, 112). Also vital in the area were the presence 
of ketemas (garrison towns) in the highland peripheries. The ketemas provided both the 
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demand and the infrastructure to facilitate domestic trade: “In these towns, the ruling 
class of neftegna, soldiers, clergymen and landlords congregated, representatives of a 
market demand exceeding in the scope of the traditional rural markets operating on the 
barter” (Markakis 2011, 112). New markets also developed as several business endeavors 
mushroomed throughout the regions. The development of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa 
Railway, completed in 1917, provided the primary means for foreign trade. Coffee, hides 
and skins became primary goods of export (Markakis 2011, 112).  The development of 
class within the Ethiopian society and growing legitimacy globally were further 
reinstated through the practice of trade.  
 The rustic image of Addis Ababa was transformed through road construction, the 
presence of motorcars and the assembling of a police force to oversee activities of the 
capital (Markakis 2011, 109). Road construction held a unique element as the Emperor 
took direct note of the importance of roads linking provinces to the capital city; he was 
keenly aware of the importance of road construction to a secure and a centralized state 
(Pelham 1969, 182). Foreign engineers and local workers were utilized in these 
endeavors. Furthermore, a radio station was also inaugurated in 1933 with the founding 
of Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones (Markakis 2011, 112). While the 
Emperor showed a relentless commitment to the physical transformations of the state 
signaling growth and modernization, the maintenance of a regressive sociopolitical 
system that held little to no accountability by the governed marked a great contradiction; 
the resistance to construct legitimate institutions would later add to the grievances of an 
ever-growing urban intelligentsia.  
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VI. Italian Interlude (1935-1941) 
 
Ethiopia fell to Italy’s occupation (1935-1941). The earlier defeat at the battle of 
Adwa left a wound in Italy and some three decades later, Italy under Mussolini returned 
for revenge. Two prolonged invasions were launched against Ethiopia from Eritrea and 
Somalia. One-quarter of a million soldiers and large number of military auxiliaries were 
used to subjugate the peoples of Ethiopia. According to Markakis, “The Italian interlude 
was a mini-rupture that separated the struggle for power at the centre before 1935 from 
the centralisation of power and its application of state-building, under the guidance of an 
absolute monarch, after 1941” (Markakis 2011, 108). During the time, The Emperor fled 
into exile, remaining abroad with his country facing enormous transformations until his 
return six years later.  
Similar to the earlier European endeavors, the Italians had a civilizing mission in 
this part of the Horn. However, their greater initiative and motivation lay in economic 
exploitation and external trade (Keller 1988, 68 & Pelham 1969, 180). Capital investment 
in Ethiopia was astounding, further drawing Ethiopia into the global capitalist political 
economy (Keller 1988, 68).  Spending on development was no less than 133,000,000 lire 
annually and government spending of 10,000,000 lire was established to meet the 
financial needs of the current administration (Pelham 1969, 180). Through such 
investments, the Italians facilitated the state-consolidation process. The heaviest 
investment went toward developmental infrastructure such as road construction. As noted 
by Markakis,  “Using native labour, the Italians constructed 3,200km of metalled and 
tarred roads with innumerable bridges within twenty-four months, and completed 
6,400km of all-weather road before they left” (Markakis 2011, 144). The roads, linking 
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the periphery to the centre also facilitated the rapid process of urbanization. Furthermore, 
they also dismantled certain elements of Ethiopia’s traditional elements and replaced 
them with modern infrastructures and institutions. Again, these new developments 
facilitated the process of extraction and capital accumulation. They accomplished two 
things: limiting the powers of traditional elites and eliminating the gabbar system of 
tenure (Keller 1988, 65). The latter brought “relief from the burden of Ethiopian rule to 
the people of the periphery, something that made its restoration in 1941 all the more 
unwelcome” (Markakis 2011, 114).        
After six years of occupation, The Ethiopian state was restored back to 
independence. Along with the Ethiopian forces, the British, Indian, Sudanese, West and 
East and Southern Africans aided the liberation fight (Keller 1988, 65). The 
infrastructures that were established by the Italians helped the Emperor establish his rule 
at his return. After WWII, the network of roads became crucial for the greater efficient 
economic exploitation of the periphery and a speedy deployment of Ethiopian forces 
(Keller 1988, 69).  
VII. Restoration and Global Politics 
 
 Upon being restored to his throne, the Emperor found himself in a situation of 
having to deal with Britain's colonial tendencies. Although they played a decisive role in 
restoring him to power, many of the commanders saw Ethiopia as an “occupied territory” 
and, potentially, an additional colonial territory (Clapham 2015, 194). Despite Britain's 
pursuit, Ethiopian independence was widely recognized under the returning rulership of 
Emperor Haile Selassie I.  However, an agreement between Britain and Ethiopia in 1942 
recognized a “special status for the British” in the fields of military and foreign advising 
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to the Emperor (Clapham 2015, 195).  British commanders ran Ethiopia’s police force 
and the employment of other foreign nationals in the Ethiopian state had to have the 
permission stamp of British officials (Zewde 1991, 179). The British were also 
instrumental in helping the emperor further consolidate his power. When a notable 
uprising began in the province of Tigray, in the Abyssinian heartland, aid from the British 
aircraft helped the regime crush the rebellion (Clapham 2015, 195). The rebellion was a 
reaction to the garrisoned Shoan governors and soldiers in the Tigray region after the 
restoration of the Emperor (Markakis 2011, 115). The strong military presence of the 
British gave them a prime opportunity to seize control of Eritrea and the territory of 
Ogaden—in what they envisioned as the “Greater Somalia” (Zewde 1991, 180). While a 
UN resolution rendered Eritrea a federation under Ethiopia (1948), the whole region of 
Ogaden was restored to Ethiopia in 1954 (Zewde 1991, 183).  
A key player in the decision regarding Eritrea was the United States. With 
America’s concern in the Middle East and a renewed interest in the Horn of Africa, the 
United States decided to strengthen its relationship with Ethiopia. The Americans had 
established a communication base in Asmara, which they felt would remain protected 
under Ethiopian rule (Zewde 1991, 183).  In return for this concession, Ethiopia received 
American development aid and investment in education (Clapham 2015, 186). Primary 
focus for education involved public health and agricultural education, public 
administration training, scholarships and locus control (Zewde 1991, 184). During this 
time, the University College of Addis Ababa was also established, later known as Haile 
Selassie I University in 1951 (Clapham 2015, 196-197). Furthermore, the United States 
established a mission to train a modern Ethiopian army (Clapham 2015, 195).  
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VIII. Centralization of State Apparatus 
 
 From the end of WWII to the 1960s, political power endured high centralization 
in the palace (Clapham 2015, 196). The power that underlined the Emperor’s politics at 
his return took on a different framework than in years past. He established an absolutist 
order with a ruling class satisfied with land property and concessions (Zewde 1991, 202). 
As the years went on, the Emperor tended to remove himself from domestic affairs, 
building his credibility in the global arena: “He carved for himself a place as a venerated 
father figure in international diplomacy” (Zewde 1991, 203). The Establishment of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa (1963) set another stepping stone 
for international recognition, while his domestic legitimacy was garnering heavy 
questioning by the masses.  
His focus on foreign policy led the Emperor to leave most of domestic affairs to 
the hands of the governing elite. The Emperor continued his policy of recruiting younger 
and educated men from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Zewde 1991, 203). These 
were men who “he had chosen himself, whose careers had unfolded under his personal 
aegis, and who depended upon him exclusively for their position” (Markakis 2011, 116). 
While most of the palace members came from modest backgrounds and the region of 
Shoa, few were Tigrayans and others, like Yilma Deresa (Minister of Finance), 
represented the Oromo ethnic group (Clapham 2015, 196). Religious diversity remained 
limited, as all were Christian men with a larger majority representing Ethiopian 
Orthodoxy (Clapham 2015, 196). Along with the speedy recruitment of educated men to 
fill the state apparatus, the 1943 decree also created a larger ministerial system, with the 
establishment of a Council of Ministers headed by the office of Prime Minister. Like the 
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previous legislative bodies, the new institution was simply given an advisory role, and 
ultimate power was vested in the Emperor (Markakis 2011, 116).   
IX. Privatization of Land and Capital Accumulation 
 
 Garnering effective control over the periphery and facilitating a more organized 
capital accumulation process became high priority for the Emperor upon his return.  The 
thirty-four provincial units that existed before the Italian invasion were now redrawn and 
integrated to create twelve large provinces: Tigray, Begemdir and Semien, Wollo, Gojja, 
Wallega, Shoa, Arsi, Sidamo, Kaffa, Gemu Foga, Illubabor and Hararge (later divided to 
create Bale province). The 1962 annexation of Eritrea yielded fourteen provinces 
(Markakis 2011, 115). Despite the restructuring of provincial administration, there was 
no reform regarding the recruitment standards of the provincial rulers: “The paramount 
criterion being loyalty to the Emperor, provincial officials as a rule had neither modern 
education nor any other relevant qualifications” (Markakis 2011, 115). They were simply 
instructed to collect taxes and to maintain “calmness” (tseteta) or security in the region 
(Markakis 2011, 115).  
The Emperor moved toward modernizing the economic sector through foreign 
investment. Imports were slowly becoming replaced with domestic manufacturing, 
although foreigners owned most of this sector (Markakis 2011, 119).  Most of the 
investment in commercial agriculture and manufacturing was conducted outside of the 
Abyssinian heartland. Markakis gives the following justification: “this was where land 
could be appropriated without economic or political cost, where a cheap and docile labor 
force was readily available, combined with the feasibility of irrigation, the presence of 
coffee, and the regime’s desire to enrich Shoa, its home base” (Markakis 2011, 120). 
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Privatization and the allotment of land to patriots, exiles, soldiers and civil servants 
faithful in times of war and peace became the norm in the southern regions but provoked 
large resistance in the north, where old communal kinship system of land tenure persisted 
(Zewde 1991, 191). The shift to private property adopted other vocabularies that showed 
the coming of “modernization.” As noted by Zewde, “the term gabbar lost its 
exploitative associations and assumed the more respectable connotation of taxpayer” 
(Zewde 1991, 192). Furthermore the privatization of land meant greater tenancy. This 
was widespread in southern provinces as depicted by the percentage of land allocations: 
75% in Hararge, 67% in Shawa and 62% in Kafa. These numbers showed comparable 
difference in the northern provinces: 15% in Bagemder, 20% in Gojjam and 25% in 
Tegre (Zewde 1991, 192).   
Revenue collection, in the form of taxes, provided new sources of income for 
state and state consolidation. Four tax policies were instituted post-liberation era:  asrat 
(tithe), land tax, education tax and health tax. The asrat tax was later amended in 1967 
and replaced with tax on agricultural income. The heaviest burden remained on the 
peasants and particularly with the land tax, Shoan residents paid the least (Markakis 
2011, 118). In the taxation system that existed up until 1967, the landlord class was 
exempted from paying taxes; this changed after the introduction of agricultural income 
(Markakis 2011, 118). Despite changes in privatization of land and tax derived from 
land-tenure, revenue from the agricultural economy still remained low at 7% of the total 
revenue (Zewde 1991, 193). Therefore, between the years 1963-1973, peasant agriculture 
was given secondary priority to commercial agriculture (Zewde 1991, 194).  
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This agricultural development plan encroached on the grazing areas of 
indigenous, pastoralist communities. In the Awash valley, large plantations were under 
way for sugar run by the DUTCH HVA company and cotton run by the British company 
Mitchell Cotts. The Swedish aid programme strived to transform the Arsi highlands of 
the Oromos into a “breadbasket of Ethiopia.” This came at the price of drawing greater 
class divisions between the indigenous peasantry and the landowners. Land leasing were 
mostly concentrated in the regions that were incorporated into the Ethiopian state during 
the late nineteenth century.  Agriculturally productive regions in the Amhara zones, for 
example Gojjam, were left untouched and any effort to measure land quickly abandoned 
at the threat of a peasant revolt (Clapham 2015, 197).  
X. Conclusion 
 
During his reign, Emperor Haile Selassie engaged in the project of development 
and modernization. State bureaucracy took shape and several efforts were undertaken to 
improve domestic education, infrastructure and international trade. However, these signs 
of progress were ridden with many contradictions. While the image of the Emperor 
gained eminence on the global sphere, the largely marginalized peasant communities, 
particularly in the highland peripheries, suffered under Abyssinian-dominated land-tenure 
structure. The question of legitimacy—first and foremost articulated through the 
Ethiopian Constitution—further reinstated the autocratic rule of the Emperor. The uneven 
development that took place between the centre and the periphery and largely, cultural 
oppression of the peripheries would finally bring the Emperor’s rule to an end. The next 
chapter traces the rise of the Ethiopian Student Movement, the impacts of the Ethiopian 
revolution, and the policies pursued by the Derg to achieve a “socialist utopia.”  
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Chapter VI: Derg Regime (1974-1991) 
I. Introduction 
 
As underscored in the previous chapter, there were contradictions in the 
Emperor’s modernization project. On the one hand, he was committed to some form of 
modernization that reformed certain institutions (i.e. education) and improved Ethiopia’s 
physical infrastructures. On the other hand, the Emperor had failed to garner full 
legitimacy and construct institutions that could accommodate diverse social groups and 
ideas. Therefore, there existed a significant gap between the sociopolitical changes 
unleashed by the modernization project and the capacity of the political system to 
respond to increasing demands for representation and a say in the political life of the 
country.  
The revolution that finally ousted the Emperor was a unique phenomenon in 
Africa. The anti-colonial struggles, which had socialist underpinnings, particularly 
common amongst Portuguese colonies, were targeted at the removal of colonial powers 
(Prunier 2015, 209). Therefore, there was not a radical commitment for a social 
transformation in the post-colonial period (Prunier 2015, 209-210). By contrast, the 
Ethiopian revolution, spearheaded first by the Ethiopian Student Movement (1965-1974), 
challenged the internal feudal and imperial order of Emperor Haile Selassie (Gudina 
2006, 126).  The goal of the revolution was to liberate the country “from the vestiges of 
feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and imperialism” (Keller 1988, 198). Drawing from 
the experiences of the French, Chinese and Russian revolutions, these students began to 
articulate their demands through Marxist ideology. Carrying the slogans “land to the 
tiller,” “national equality” and “social justice,” the students searched for a new paradigm 
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to redefine the political ideology of the Ethiopian state and most importantly, to address 
the political and economic shortcomings of the past (Gudina 2006, 126).  
This chapter assesses the condition of Ethiopia and the state-building project 
under the post-revolution dictatorial rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Key in the 
assessment is the reshaping of state-institutions away from a capitalist and imperialist 
society to one of socialism, although the institutionalization of such ideology did not fully 
materialize. The failure of the socialist project could mainly be attributed to the tensions 
between the decentralization of power to empower peasants and the centralization of state 
bureaucracy for greater control over the periphery. Another arena of contradiction was 
the prioritization of the class struggle over the national struggle. Furthermore, key themes 
in sight are the question of legitimacy and the ‘national question.’  
II. Pathway to Revolution: Tracing Economic and Political Discontent  
 
The imperial regime failed to bring about genuine transformation at a time when 
Ethiopia faced both internal and external challenges (Prunier 2015, 211). Both the 
constitution and parliament remained hallowed institutions that failed to produce real 
changes benefiting the masses (Prunier 2015, 211). The Emperor’s pursuit to centralize 
his power after the Italian defeat meant further bureaucratization of the state and higher 
taxation, the heaviest burden falling on the peasantry. The mid-twentieth century also 
ushered in a season of economic depression, leading to grave urban employment and 
inflation (Markakis 2011, 162-165); urban unemployment at the time ran at 40-50% 
(Prunier 2015, 212). During the previous regime, the more educated were easily 
accommodated within the state apparatus; the rising intelligentsia now lacked its 
privileged place in the country. Rising population growth further exacerbated the problem 
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of unemployment: the population of Addis Ababa grew from 300,000 to 700,000 twenty 
years prior the revolution (Prunier 2015, 212).   
Global economic changes and the downturn of the economy also had tremendous 
impact on Ethiopia. The 1973 oil shock caused Ethiopia’s petroleum bill to triple within 
just one year (Prunier 2015, 214). Mass demonstrations in the cities and boycott by taxi-
drivers followed. At the time, almost 70 % of Ethiopia’s economy was concentrated in 
the hands of foreign investment. Capitalists in the Ethiopian society were “mostly 
aristocrats who played the role of local partners but had no real autonomy” (Prunier 2015, 
211). Foreign trade and state revenue decreased due to the closing of the Suez Canal and 
the price of coffee in the international market dropped tremendously (Markakis 2011, 
164). Furthermore, the economy held distinct separation between the rural, agricultural 
sector, which existed “at the level of subsistence,” and a “modern” sector that 
characterized consumption and exports in the urban region (Prunier 2015, 212). This 
uneven development between urban and rural areas, in addition to the famine of 1972-
1974, concentrated in the regions of Tigray and Wollo, caused great agitation (Markakis 
2011, 165). Though the famine was not as severe as the one that took place in 1888-92, it 
merited a strong intervention from abroad. The flamboyant lifestyle of the Emperor and 
his men and the indifference expressed toward the fate of those suffering from the famine 
disaster caused great frustration among the masses (Prunier 2015, 214).  
These developments along with the manifest incapacity of the Ethiopian state to 
deal with these multifaceted problems further exacerbated the disarticulation of state and 
society. Furthermore, the greater unity of the country under one “Ethiopian” national 
banner was brought into greater scrutiny. With the growth of the Ethiopian Student 
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Movement (ESM) in the 1960s, “national oppression” became part of the political 
discourse and a subject of heavy debate (Gudina 2006, 122). The rising intelligentsia 
questioned Ethiopia’s centralized state apparatus, significantly reinforced by Shoan 
dominance. Many student voices raised objections against Amhara political and cultural 
imperialism. The author Wallelign Makonnen gave the first well-written Marxist 
articulation to the problem of national oppression. In “On the Question of Nationalities in 
Ethiopia,” he addressed the very problem of Ethiopia’s nation-building project:  
To be a ‘genuine Ethiopian’ one has to speak Amharic, to listen to 
Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox 
Christianity, and to wear the Amhara-Tigre shamma in international 
conferences. In some cases to be an ‘Ethiopian’, you will even have to 
change your name. In short, to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an 
Amhara mask (quoted in Markakis 2011, 164).  
 
These words appeared in the university’s student newspaper. After the murder of 
the outspoken president of the University student union and a burial ceremony interrupted 
by indiscriminate shootings from the Imperial Bodyguard, the hope for political and 
social reformation under the Emperor quickly dwindled; revolution was in the air 
(Markakis 2011, 164). This particular moment of intrusion revealed the decadence of the 
Emperor’s hegemony over the Ethiopian state. Rather than consensus serving as a basis 
for legitimacy, supreme dominance became a way to secure and sustain power and 
authority. The counter-hegemonic drive, expressed through the revolution, became a 
response to finally remove Emperor Haile Selassie and restore power into the hands of 
the civil society.  
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III. Framing the Ideological Struggle   
 
After the fall of the Emperor, the challenge remained to construct a “social myth” 
that would yield a new political and economic order (Keller 1988, 191). The radical call 
for change arose out of the youthful, urban intelligentsia who embraced the doctrine of 
Marxism as “the scripture of modernity” (De Waal 2015, 157).  Those that entertained 
revolution in Ethiopia read Lenin’s writings, the most popularly reading being “What is 
to be done?” considering the organization and the implementation of a Social Democratic 
Revolution (Lata 1999, 86). The student movement also drew inspiration from Mao 
Zedong's treatise On Contradictions (Markakis 2011, 162). Ethiopia’s call for a socialist 
state was not new to the Horn of Africa, as Ethiopia’s neighbors, Sudan and Somalia, had 
committed to scientific socialism since 1969  (Markakis 2011, 169).  
The ideological basis of the student movement interpreted both the problems and 
solutions for Ethiopia as a class struggle, rather than a national struggle, against systems 
of feudalism and imperialism. The first contradiction arose from the interpretations of 
Ethiopia’s past challenges and future prospects. Town-bred radicals, committed to the 
Marxist ideology, held little understanding of the conditions in the countryside (Markakis 
2011, 162). Spearheading the ideological movement, the focus on the struggle over 
material life relegated the “national question,” dominant in the periphery, a secondary 
status. That being said, national oppression was not erased from the class struggle 
interpretation. Instead, it was encapsulated within the larger “class struggle thesis” 
(Gudina 2006, 122). The class lens thus became a way to build bonds that surpassed 
geographical and ethnic divisions.  
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A new vocabulary for the political and social imagination arose out of the radical 
movement. The word “Abyot” from the Geez term “to refuse” or “to refuse to obey” was 
coined to capture the spirit of “revolution.” The word for “socialism” became the 
combination of Hibrette (social) and sebawinet (humane). The concept of “nation” was 
captured by a newly coined word-beher (Markakis 2011, 167-168). Through its first 
clear-cut statement, Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia first), the Derg would later articulate its 
commitment to the ideologies of hebrettesebawinet (communism) (Keller 1988, 193). 
Similar to other kinds of African socialism, communism in Ethiopia entailed a 
commitment to “equality, justice, self-reliance, the dignity of labor, cooperativeness, 
cultural pride, and above all national unity” (Keller 1988, 193). The new structure of 
government and other domestic and international policies arose out of a commitment to 
the socialist project (Keller 1988, 193).  
IV. Urban Opposition and the Red Terror 
 
The Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (Derg) seized power by 
overthrowing the Emperor. Ranging from a plain soldier to a major in the army, the 
military junta consisted of over one hundred members (Markakis 2011, 168). Following 
an intense internal power struggle2 within the Derg, which saw the murder of several 
high-ranking members of the committee, Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as the 
unquestioned leader of the junta in 1977 (Markakis 2011, 169). Their unity was based not 
																																																								
2During the initial formation of the PMAC, the Derg was under the leadership of General Aman Andom. 
General Aman held a moderate stance and supported a level of autonomy for the previously colonized 
territory of Eritrea (Donham 1999: 22). In November 1974, controversy over the Eritrean issue and a 
suggestion for a negotiated settlement with Eritrean nationalist led to the general’s execution. The Derg 
also ordered the execution of fifty-seven other political prisoners (Keller 1988: 192).  
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on some common ideology but a general dissatisfaction with the power of the Emperor 
(Markakis 2011, 168). 
The Marxist ideas of the revolutionaries took initial institutional forms through 
two civil society organizations that each claimed their vanguard roles in the movement 
and were multi-ethnic in nature: EPRP (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party) and All 
Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Amharigna acronym MEISONE) (Markakis 2011, 163). 
Both were the offspring of the Ethiopian Student Movement and declared scientific 
socialism as a philosophical tool to transform the Ethiopian state (Gudina 2006, 126). 
However, the soldiers, who named themselves Workers in Uniform, also claimed the 
vanguard role (Markakis 2011, 163). Although the Derg had secured its formal state 
power, two principal issues remained that would bring the military junta in conflict and 
contradictory positions with these organizations: the secession movement in Eritrea and 
the role of civilians in the governmental apparatus; a call for a “people’s government” 
arose from the radicals of the Ethiopian student movement (Donham 1999, 21). The 
question remained as to who would lead the revolution.   
The EPRP, mostly composed of Amhara leadership with strong ties to the 
Ethiopian Student Association in the United States, proved to be more “leftist” than the 
Derg (Prunier 2015, 219).  The EPRP supported the right of nations and nationalities to 
self-determination both in theory and in practice (Gudina 2006, 123). With regards to the 
independence of Eritrea, EPRP also showed great openness to the independent struggle 
(Prunier 2015, 219). The Derg’s implementation of swift changes and resistance to any 
civilian opposition led the EPRP to labeling it “fascist”, beginning a series of direct 
confrontations with the Derg regime (Prunier 2015, 219).  On the other hand, the 
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MEISONE supported the new regime and although recognizing the rights of nations and 
nationalities to self-determination up to secession, sought to solve the problem through 
the unified framework of Ethiopia (Gudina 2006, 123). MEISONE was readily willing to 
collaborate with the Derg in order to facilitate the construction of a fully functioning 
socialist society (Prunier 2015, 219). The creation of the Political Office for Mass 
Organization (POMOA) was a logical outcome of this collaboration, as both sides sought 
to garner support through mass mobilization (Prunier 2015, 220). But MEISONE and the 
Derg were headed to a direct collision, given the mismatches between their ideological 
convictions. After marginalizing the EPRP, the Derg turned to MEISONE, essentially 
driving it underground on the grounds of its “nationalist deviationism” linked to its large 
Oromo membership (Markakis 2011, 168 & Prunier 2015, 219).  
Revolutions, often romanticized, are violently destructive events in which 
revolutionaries tend to use considerable violence and coercion to consolidate their power. 
In this regard, Ethiopia was no exception. As it became apparent that the sense of 
cautious optimism that prevailed in the immediate aftermath of the revolution was 
dissipated, the Derg and its erstwhile civilian partners engaged in assassinations and 
counter-assassinations as each side sought to assert supremacy in the struggle for political 
power and control of the state. The resulting urban violence led to a violent period in 
which the Derg used revolutionary terror, known as the Red Terror, to liquidate its 
adversaries. After the labeling of EPRP as “anarchist” in 1976, the Derg unleashed 
massive raids and killings. Death tolls reached frantic levels as the Red Terror ravaged 
the urban areas. Between the years 1977-1978, almost five thousand young people were 
assassinated (Keller 1988, 200). The outcome of this struggle was key as the Derg, under 
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the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, emerged as the most dominant force in the 
region.  
IV. Building the Political Apparatus  
 
An effective state center, under the guidance of a vanguard party, was deemed 
crucial for the development of a socialist state (Keller 1988, 230). The Derg understood 
that in order to secure its control of the state apparatus and bolster state authority, it either 
had to eliminate or co-opt the radicalized left (Keller 1988, 197). It achieved both through 
the announcement of the Program for the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR)3, the 
founding of the Yekatit 66 (February 1973) Ideological School4, the Provisional Office 
for Mass Organizational Affairs (POMOA), and the installment of an advisory political 
body, the Politbureau (Keller 1988, 197).  
There was a political vacuum created after the demise of the old order. The 
military junta thus fabricated a new “socialist elite” to fill the political vacuum for 
governance: “Western education was the trademark of this class, hastily garnished with a 
dose of raw Marxism provided in a special training centre” (Markakis 2011, 175). Unlike 
in the previous imperial regime, the new state actors were ethnically heterogeneous 
(although the precise nature of ethnic composition was never stated), prominent in the 
cadre and in the ranks of the military being the Oromo: “The Abyssinian element 
remained dominant, but was supplemented by expanding recruitment from the highland 
periphery, leavening with the beginnings of Muslim participation, and even a token 
representation from the lowland periphery” (Markakis 2011, 175). Senior civil servants 																																																								
3The PNDR document articulated a commitment to scientific socialism and outlined a “noncapitalist 
strategy for socialist development.” Similar to the statements in Ethiopia Tikdem, it interpreted Ethiopia’s 
condition through Marx’s theory of class struggle (Keller 1988: 197).  
4The school facilitated the learning of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.		
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were required a time of re-education to understand the socialist agenda of state building. 
Many state agents were sent to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Cuba for 
“ideological indoctrination just as selected teachers and students had been” (Keller 1988, 
231).  
Securing a vanguard party remained one of the primary challenges of the Derg 
regime. After some period of transformation, the POMOA became the Commission to 
Organize the Party of the Working Peoples of Ethiopia (COPWE) in 1979. Of the 123 
members of the central committee within COPWE, 79 represented military or police 
offers (Keller 1988, 237).  The first general congress of the commission took place the 
summer of 1980, followed by a second gathering in 1983. At the third and final congress, 
the workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was formed September of 1984, replacing the 
former COPWE congress (Keller 1988, 235). The founding congress of the WPE 
coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Revolution (Markakis 2011, 178). The WPE 
full committee consisted of 29 members of armed forces and at least 44 ex-soldiers. 
Among the 139 full memberships, representatives of mass organizations held only 22 
positions (Keller 1988, 235). The heavy dominance of Derg members in the WPE central 
committee indicated the undemocratic nature of representation.  
The long search for the establishment of a civilian-based vanguard party must also 
be understood in light of changing global partnerships. In the aftermath of the Ethiopian 
revolution, the Derg’s human rights problems had led to the rupturing of relations with 
the United States. As a result, the new regime had made overtures to the Soviet Union in 
an effort to enjoy its patronage. The establishment of the WPE in 1984 as a “civilian-
based vanguard party” was the culmination of this new pro-Soviet orientation that had 
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been underway since the rupture with the US (Keller 1988, 201). In other words, the 
inauguration of WPE was a response to the Soviet demand for a vanguard party, a 
necessary condition for the implementation of socialism. With Soviet Union as its 
primary partner, the Derg also sought to establish alliances with Cuba and other Eastern 
bloc countries (Keller 1988, 200-201).  
VI. Security and Legitimacy  
 
On December 1974, the Derg devised a ten-point programme that derived from its 
first statement of policy: Ityopia Tikdim (Ethiopia First) (Donham 1999, 26). This 
emphasized themes of equality, self-reliance, the nation, nationalization of the economy 
and elimination of the old feudal order of landlordism (quoted in Donham 1999, 26). The 
programme placed high emphasis on the common good that would link Ethiopia across 
ethnic, religious and geographical differences.  One of the priorities of the regime was 
garnering control over the country’s periphery, in which much of the resistance to the 
authority of the regime was taking place in the form of outright secessionist movements 
that demanded greater political autonomy from the center.  
In order to spread the tenets of socialism and make “decentralization” of power 
possible, the Derg developed the Zemecha (Amharic word for campaign) in 1974.  These 
were a band of sixty thousand high school and university students selected to explain the 
aims of the revolution in the countryside (Keller 1988, 193). In the words of Edmond 
Keller, this signified “socialism by the back door” (Keller 1988, 192). These students, 
like an army, were sent out to “reconquer” the countryside. This time though, this would 
not be by force, but with knowledge (Donham 1999, 29). Many tensions developed as the 
students, well versed in the writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao, proved to be more radical 
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than the Derg (Keller 1988, 194), partly spurring the red terror discussed in the previous 
section.  
The Derg also set out to create new mass organizations as well as strengthen 
existing organizations such as All-Ethiopia Trade Union, Dwellers Association and the 
All-Ethiopia Peasant Association. The formation of peasant associations (gabbar kebele) 
in the countryside and that of urban dwellers associations in the towns and cities was one 
of the most significant developments that heralded a break of sorts from the previous 
regime. By 1987, there was some 20,000 gabbar kebele in Ethiopia” (Markakis 2011,  
172). The students sent out through the zemecha campaign, more radical than the Derg 
members themselves, strived to transform these peasant associations into real systems for 
self-governance. In other words, they took charge in hopes of transforming these local 
institutions into vehicles for decentralized form of governance. They took charge in 
aiding the peasants elect kebele leaders and find other methods for self-administration: 
“Great pressure was brought on the Dergue to recognize the kebele as institutions of local 
government” (Markakis 2011, 172).  Farmers were now encouraged to organize 
themselves with one association for every eight hundred hectares of land (Keller 1988: 
194). Judicial tribunals among the Kebeles now had jurisdiction to handle cases and 
offences against the Penal Code (Markakis 2011, 172).  Furthermore, the kebeles 
collected taxes and were given permission to develop armed defense squads in their 
regions  (Markakis 2011, 172).  
Unfortunately, the changes introduced during the Zemecha campaign did not last 
long. Freely elected kebele leadership was removed from their post, further becoming 
replaced by Derg’s representatives from the centre. Peasant associations, which were 
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originally designed as mechanisms for self-rule, became restructured to “impose central 
policy decisions.” The economic fate of the peasantry also remained the same, perhaps 
worse, than the imperial era (Beken 2012, 90). The resistance to control is important to 
note, as the regime interpreted local autonomy as a threat to a highly militarized and 
centralized state. 
The Derg sought to garner legitimacy in the periphery through implementing new 
policies concerning land tenure. The 1975 land reform nationalized all rural land and 
usurped the land without any compensation. Recalling themes from the French 
Revolution, the Derg stated: “It is essential to fundamentally alter the agrarian relations 
so that the Ethiopia peasant masses which have paid so much in sweat as in blood to 
maintain extravagant feudal class may be liberated” (quoted in Donham 1999, 27). 
Furthermore, the state established standards for land distribution and eliminated the sale 
and rent of land and hired labor (Markakis 2011, 170). As a revolutionary reform, this 
attacked the old feudal order of land ownership and undermined the economic 
foundations of the imperial system (Markakis 2011, 170). The impact of the reform was 
felt especially in the highland peripheries were systems of neftegna and ballabat persisted 
and were now abolished (Markakis 2011, 170). Through this decision, rural land was now 
transferred into the hands of the state; there was also an attempt to standardize land 
allotment at ten hectares or less granted to each conjugal family unit (Keller 1988, 194). 
Furthermore, as noted by Markakis, “the reform did not inspire commensurate 
enthusiasm in the northern provinces, where smallholding was the rule and large estates 
and tenancy the exception” (Markakis 2011, 170). In these areas, peasants had customary 
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rights to land, held greater level of mobility to identify with local elites and there was no 
ethnic differentiation between landlords and peasants (Donham 1999, 31).  
In the urban regions, land policy was structured to get the wealth out of the hands 
of the urban-based privileged class. The Derg nationalized about 409,000 urban houses 
and apartments (quoted in Keller 1988, 196). Kebeles, newly created urban dwellers’ 
associations, took charge of administrating these newly created units (Keller 1988, 196). 
New housing units with low rents were now built on urban land that previously 
“belonged to members of the royal family, the mobility, or urban-based indigenous 
entrepreneurs” (Keller 1988, 196). The land reforms accomplished a type of alliance 
between the Derg, parts of the intelligentsia, southern peasants, and the urban poor 
(Donham 1988, 32).  
VI. Resettlement and Villagization  
 
 Another season of drought in the early 1980s threatened the countryside, 
particularly in the north. Although help in international famine aid was distributed to the 
Dergue, it refused to transport aid to interior areas (funds continued to be used for other 
social and military purposes) nor did it use other means, such as Zemecha, to help in the 
endeavor: “The toll taken by this famine was estimated at one million souls” (Markakis 
2011, 173-174 & Keller 1988, 225). The regime decided to react to the famine by 
implementing one of the most controversial policy decisions during the Derg era. The 
plan devised to resettle some 1.5 million people affected in the drought-prone regions to 
the “so-called virgin lands in the south which had adequate rainfall” (Keller 1988, 225). 
Between 1984-5, the regime and its cadre evacuated about 700,000 individuals to 
different reasons of the South such as Kaffa, Gojjam, Gondar, Wollega, and Illubabor 
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(Keller 1988, 225-226). The vulnerable population were “mainly from Wollo (62.4 %), 
Shoa (18.4 %), Tigray (15.3 %), and went to the lowlands of western Ethiopia and to 
parts of the south” (Markakis 2011, 174). Despite the claim that the resettlement process 
was done solely for humanitarian purposes, critics contend there was larger political 
underpinnings to the relocation process. Some argue that the evacuation was done to 
depopulate the region from those involved in or supporting the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (quoted in 
Keller 1988, 226). Others also contend that the regime purposefully disrupted the efforts 
given by international relief agencies to bring the famine under control (Keller 1988, 
226). 
To further garner control over the periphery, villagization programs were also 
instituted through the rural land-reform policy, as part of the “Ten year Perspective Plan” 
(Keller 1988, 228).  Following the invasion of Bale Province by Somali forces in 1977, 
most of the province became villagized (Keller 1988, 227). According to government 
officials, the villagization project in the sparsely populated areas of Bale secured better 
education, healthcare, agricultural extension and safe water opportunities (Keller 1988, 
228).  In late 1985, processes of villagization took place in places like Shoa and Arussi 
and in smaller scales in the regions of Gojjam, Wollega, Kaffa, Sidamo, and Illubabor 
(Keller 1988, 228). There was some resistance shown to this project in the Hararge 
lowlands, western Shoa and Gojjam (Keller 1988, 229). The long-term goal of the project 
was to move as many as thirty-three million people into villagized communities by 1994 
(Keller 1988, 228). Like the resettlement programs, the political ramifications of these 
programs cannot be ignored. In places like Bale and Hararge, some claim that the 
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program was designed to “separate the general population from insurgent movements” 
(Keller 1988, 229).  
VII. The ‘National’ Question 
 
After the ousting of the Emperor, the Derg faced considerable ethno-nationalist 
resistance. In addition to the Eritreans, the Oromo, Sidama, Somali, Afar, Anywaa and 
Berta all launched their struggle for “national liberation,” threatening the territorial 
integrity of the Ethiopian state (Markakis 2011, 186). This called for a great expansion of 
the military, creating the largest army in sub-Saharan Africa (quoted in De Waal 2015, 
158). The secessionist movements, tracing their roots to the initial formation of the 
Ethiopian state under the leadership of Menelik II, launched their counter-movements 
against Shewan-Amhara dominance. As discussed in the previous chapters, the southern 
peoples of Ethiopia were forcefully incorporated into the Ethiopian state; thus, the state 
lacked legitimacy, particularly in the countryside. Through its doctrine of Ethiopia 
Tikdem (Ethiopia first) and andinet (oneness), the Derg envisioned a unified Ethiopia, 
thus retaining an unrelenting emphasis on territorial sovereignty and unity (Keller 1988, 
202).   
Although the affirmation of equality and respect for previously oppressed people 
groups and cultures was stated, there was no clear vision for creating an “inclusive 
national culture shared by all Ethiopians” (Markakis 2011, 185). In other words, the 
previous imperial policies of “Amharisation” were not explicitly condemned nor 
defended.  The status of “Amharigna” as the national language and lingua franca was 
reinstated and education was used to spread the language in rural regions (Markakis 
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2011, 186). Consistent with Marxist ideology, the Derg framed the national struggle as a 
class struggle, reducing ethnic conflicts to mere “class contradictions” (Keller 1988, 203).  
The two southern peoples who advanced the colonial thesis5 in fighting for 
liberation were the Somali of Ogaden region and the Oromo elites (Gudina 2006, 124). 
The conquest of the Ogaden region during the time of Menelik separated the Somalis in 
Ethiopia from those living outside of the Ethiopian borders in the countries of Somalia, 
Kenya and Djibouti (Beken 2012, 87-88). Furthermore, the Ethiopian Somalis of the 
Ogaden faced exclusion based on their religion. As Muslims, they were historically in the 
margins of Ethiopia’s national narrative. Thus, the Somali Ogadenis faced “a triple 
oppression: on national, religious and class grounds” (Gudina 2006, 124). The 
independence of Somalia in 1960 held a vision for the unification of Somalis dispersed in 
these regions. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), established in 1960, 
supported this pan-Somali vision. The WSLF struggled for the incorporation of the 
Ogaden region into the territorial boundaries of Somalia (Beken 2012, 88). In July of 
1977, supporting the WSLF and under the dictates of Siad Barre, Somali troops invaded 
Ethiopia. In 1978, with the help of the Soviet Union and Cuban soldiers, Ethiopia forces 
were able to oust Somali forces from Ethiopia’s borders (Beken 2012, 89). The aid given 
by the communist bloc helped in the defeat of Somali troops and was also pivotal in 
destroying other insurgencies in the south (quoted in De Waal 2015, 158). The 
subsequent victory signaled the consolidation of the Derg’s power and the further 
institutionalization of its policies.  
																																																								
5The colonial thesis reinstated the southern conquest by the northern Abyssinians as a colonial endeavor, 
perpetuating centre-periphery relationship.  
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The 1960s saw the rise of Oromo nationalism, reflected both in the Bale revolt 
(1963-1970) and the development of the Macha-Tulama Association, founded in 1963 
(Beken 2012, 89). After the fall of Haile Selassie, the Derg attempted to mitigate the 
grievances of the Oromo people; the Oromo people themselves supported some of these 
policies (Beken 2012, 89). The land reform was the major stepping-stone toward 
amending past policies under Menelik II and Haile Selassie I.  The Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF), established in 1974, drew its members from the radicalized bunch of the 
Ethiopian Student Movement and was armed for the independence of Oromia (Beken 
2012, 90). Like the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which struggled for the 
independence of Eritrea, it justified its liberation struggle on the basis of earlier 
Abyssinian colonization (Beken 2012, 90).  
The separatist movement for an independent Eritrea was first expressed through 
the founding of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) in 1958. ELM sought to 
achieve its objectives through diplomatic pursuits and UN intervention (Zewde 1991, 
219). However, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), formed by Eritrean exiles in 1961, 
gained greater momentum and demanded independence through a concerned support 
from outside powers. The ELF held strong Muslim support and its pan-Arabic and pan-
Islamic stance drew support from the Arab World. However, this would cause heavy 
conflict with its Eritrean Christian counterpart, which also gained strong support during 
the Ethiopian Student Movement (quoted in Beken 2012, 91). The EPLF represented the 
rival organization established by Christian Eritreans who converted to Marxism during 
the Student Movement. This group, with a strong Marxist and nationalist ideology and 
Christian leadership attracted more followers committed to guerilla warfare to secure the 
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independence of Eritrea (Markakis 2011, 184). After two civil wars between both 
separatist movements, Eritrea would secure its independence in 1994 after the fall of the 
Derg regime.    
Another ethno-national struggle was also underway by the Tigray people in the 
northern region of Ethiopia. The grievances of the people of Tigray trace their roots to the 
time of Menelik II. The people of Tigray linked their fate and constant experience of 
famine to Amhara domination and their frustration remained political, economic and 
cultural (Markakis 2011, 188 & Beken 2012, 94). However, these frustrations were also 
linked by a sense of the “golden past” of the Tigrayan people, going back to the times of 
the Axum Empire (quoted in Beken 2012, 95).  When The Derg took power, “Tigray 
was, by any measure, the most neglected and poverty stricken province in the Abyssinian 
homeland” (Markakis 2011, 188). Little development took place in the province of 
Tigray with peasant landholding also remaining minimal (Markakis 2011, 188). In 1975, 
the Tigryan students established the Tigryan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) during the 
Ethiopian student movement. After fourteen years of guerilla fight, TPLF would emerge 
to seize power in Addis Ababa (Markakis 2011, 189).  
VIII. Conclusion  
 
The attempt to radically shift from a feudal, capitalist society to one of socialism 
had a significant impact on state formation in Ethiopia. The vision of socialism carried by 
the Derg remained quite unclear and through the resettlement and villagization programs, 
communities were uprooted and social relations severed. The Red Terror launched 
against civil-society organizations indicated the establishment of the Derg as a military 
dictatorship. There was a clear tension between the Derg’s instinct for centralization and 
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the practical imperative for making concessions to the population. The kebeles and 
peasant associations were significant institutional developments that emerged early in the 
immediate aftermath of the revolution; they played a major role in the struggle for power 
between the Derg and its civilian opponents. The struggle to secure power over the ethnic 
peripheries was also eminent during the time of the Derg regime. The Derg’s policies of 
mass resettlement and villagization were not only intended to deal with the crisis of 
famine; they were also intended to curb the secessionist movements that threatened state 
sovereignty. The framing of Ethiopian politics on the basis of class, subordinating the 
issue of nationality as a secondary question, had severe implications. The next chapter 
will look at the ways the TPLF led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) coalition addresses the “national question” under the developmentalist state of 
Meles Zenawi.   
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Chapter VII: EPRDF Regime (1991-2012) 
I. Introduction 
 
 The collapse of the Derg and the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991 was the 
outcome of a decade and half of intense civil war. EPRDF was an umbrella organization 
consisting of six ethnically based opposition groups, with Tigrayan People’s Liberation 
Front (TPLF) at the centre (Keller & Smith 2005, 266). The many national movements 
that gained full force at the closing of the Derg regime gave rise to the political system of 
ethnic federalism. The nationalist question that caused the previous civil war against the 
Derg was one in which the overly centralized Ethiopian state was ill equipped to address. 
As such, the EPRDF, being an amalgam of different ethno-regional groups clamoring for 
some representation in a multiethnic federation, had little choice but to adopt this system, 
which was considered sufficiently accommodating to the demands of its partner 
organizations.  
The precipitous collapse of the Ethiopian state created a momentary institutional 
vacuum at the center. In the immediate aftermath of the end of the civil war, the 
centralized state was no longer available to put a lid on subnational discontents that 
threatened to upset the equilibrium that had historically been in place. The adoption of 
the system of ethnic federalism is, thus, intelligible in the context not only of the long-
standing nationalist question but also of the immediate threat of disintegration staring 
postwar state-makers. Furthermore, the decentralization implicit in the system of ethnic 
federalism was viewed as “the best to demonstrate the regime’s commitment to social 
equity and democracy” (Keller & Smith 2005, 266).  
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 In this chapter, I will assess the process of state building that took place under the 
EPRDF regime. Zenawi’s vision of constructing a democratic developmental state drew 
inspiration from the success of the Southeast Asian countries. Yet, the state under 
EPRDF rule faced many domestic and international challenges that laid bare the inherent 
contradictions in this project: the challenges of ethnic federalism system as a way of 
practicing decentralized form of governance and the pressures of an international 
neoliberal order are of importance among many. The chapter traces the political ideology 
of the EPRDF government, the implementation of ethnic federalism and the economic 
priorities of the regime for the project of state building. While Ethiopia has scored rising 
GDP growth since the late 20th century, marked with economic growth in the modern 
sector, poverty among its peasant population still remains a challenge to be addressed.  
II. Ascension to Power and the establishment of EPRDF  
 
As stated in the previous chapter, TPLF was one of the earliest sub-national 
challengers to the Derg regime. Their ethno-national struggle stemmed from Amhara 
political hegemony, the reoccurring tragedy of famine in the region and impoverished 
fate of the Tigrayan peasant under Ethiopia’s successive regimes.  During the early days 
of the revolution, from 1975 to 1985, the TPLF agenda held an ethno-nationalist stance; 
however, it did not clearly promote or object to the idea of secession (Prunier 2015, 420). 
Its nationalist leaning had, however, helped the party gain support from its Tigre-situated 
peasantry (Prunier 2015, 420). The changing stance of the TPLF and the creation of 
EPRDF took place in the midst of swift domestic and international changes. The fall of 
the Derg regime and years of civil war had left the country in complete economic 
disaster, grave infrastructural damage and on the brink of regional balkanization. The 
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civil war had a significantly adverse impact on the country’s agrarian economy. After the 
fall of the Derg, the country was also left with only a few million dollars of foreign 
exchange, unable to finance imports and economic development (Prunier 2015, 
425).   Besides through empty political rhetoric and slogans, the Derg also never devised 
concrete policies and solutions to address the ‘national question.’ In the international 
scene, there was a shift in the power politics of the Cold War.  
The retreat of the Soviet Union and the military aid cut-off from the Derg 
undermined the political and economic power of the military junta; furthermore, the rise 
of the United States as the uncontested global hegemon signaled a new partnership for the 
Ethiopian government to come (Markakis 2015, 230).  Since the TPLF began as an 
ethno-nationalist movement uninterested in secessionism, it had to form an alliance with 
other nationalist movements if it was going to be part of a political system in the context 
of a multiethnic society. Soon after, the TPLF set about to create EPRDF, a coalition of 
four-ethnically defined organizations made up of previous regional/national fronts (De 
Waal 2015, 159). This coalition was somewhat of a “trans-ethnic alliance,” although 
TPLF remained at the centre (Prunier 2015, 424). The true power-sharing nature of the 
coalition and TPLF hegemony are still debated (Prunier 2015, 423).    
III. EPRDF Ideology  
 
EPRDF began identifying the larger challenges that confronted the Ethiopian state 
after the fall of the Derg regime. The centralization of power under the “rentier state,” 
the  “ethnocratic” nature of power and wealth concentration in the hands of a single 
ethnic group, and political and economic oppression of the masses in the periphery were 
identified as the primary factors for Ethiopia’s history of underdevelopment (Vaughan 
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2015, 284). According to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, there was one thing that would 
ensure the security and survival of the Ethiopian state: accelerated growth of Ethiopia’s 
economy. This entailed building a class basis that could sustain the country’s 
development and democracy (De Waal 2015, 163).  Rather than the polarized debate 
between capitalism and socialism, the core of Mele’s argument was “rent-seeking versus 
revolutionary democracy” (De Waal 2015, 163). 
The idea of a revolutionary democracy marked a critical component of EPRDF’s 
political philosophy and policy direction. Following the Derg’s policy of land reform, 
EPRDF saw the peasantry as a homogeneous bunch, with common needs and political 
ideologies (Markakis 2011, 249). Consequently, only one venue or political apparatus 
was deemed necessary or legitimate to capture this peasant interest (Markakis 2011, 249). 
Contrasting the previous regime’s struggle to establish a vanguard party to lead the 
socialist agenda, EPRDF quickly claimed its vanguard leadership, creating a type of 
ruling party-state coalition that secured hegemony over all political and economic life 
(Lefort 2015, 360). 6  Revolutionary democracy was different from that of liberal 
democracy, in that the latter resulted from a fully matured capitalist market, something 
Ethiopia lacked. Furthermore, at the heart of revolutionary democracy is the notion that 
the masses need some guidance in arriving at democratic decisions.  Therefore, a party-
state was needed to direct the masses and promote their rights (Lefort 2015, 360).   
The idea of the democratic developmental state was inspired from the experiences 
of Asian countries, specifically South Korea and Taiwan. These experiences would then 																																																								
6The history of Marxist influence continues to shape the conception of political power and the proper 
relationship between party and state. This history, in part, explains the EPRDF’s commitment to a strong 
state apparatus, even as it seeks to decentralize power. Unity of party and state, which to some extent 
characterizes the current regime, is the core tenet of Marxist ideology.  	
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be adapted to fit the socio-political circumstances of Ethiopia (De Waal 2015, 165). The 
TPLF proposed that Ethiopia was still at a “pre-capitalist stage” and, thus, “major free 
market economy forces” have yet to mature to compete in the global market. Therefore, 
EPRDF showed resistance to the neo-liberal paradigm that would render the state a 
“night watchman state” and virtually allow the free-market to rule; this would hinder the 
state from needed intervention in the market and lead to a “dead end” (Lefort 2015, 360). 
EPRDF reasoned that the state should actively capture economic rents, using its 
monopoly for the purpose of value creation. In other words, the funds derived from these 
rents should be used for the government-directed development and state-building project 
(De Waal 2015, 164).   
The developmental state envisioned had three elements: “autonomy from the 
private sector, obsession with development and hegemony of developmental discourse” 
(quoted in De Waal 2015, 163-164). First, the developmental state would both lead and 
remain interdependent with the private sector. With a satisfied peasantry and a growing 
middle-class population, the developmental state would be able to overcome the problem 
of rent-seeking. Despite the success that has come out of growth in the private sector 
since then, EPRDF concluded that it held no more faith “in the private sector’s capacity 
to promote development, than it had in the political opposition to promote democracy” 
(Markakis 2011, 263). Second, through a commitment to the project of development, 
economic growth is seen as the only means of survival and effective state building. Third, 
hegemony of developmental discourse would entail conceptualizing development not 
only in terms of capital accumulation but also the strengthening of technical capacity to 
achieve development, such as education at the secondary and tertiary levels. Zenawi’s 
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investment initiatives and political authoritarianism were all “cut from the same 
theoretical path” of the democratic developmental state (De Waal 2015, 165).  
IV. Ethnic Federalism: Constitutional Provisions  
 
In the 1991 charter, the EPRDF government spelled out three concrete reforms: 
“decentralization of the state, democratization of its politics, under a multi-party electoral 
system, and liberalization of the economy, in a neo-liberal international climate” 
(Vaughan 2015, 284). The process of decentralization, democratization and commitment 
toward socio-economic advancement were seen as forward solutions to Ethiopia’s state-
building project and a response to the shortcomings of Ethiopia’s previous predatory 
politics. The reforms introduced by the EPRDF addressed two issues that were cultural 
and political in nature through the coining of “ethnic federalism.” Again, the recognition 
of a federal government in line with the multi-national character of Ethiopia was a 
response to the historical grievances of marginalized ethnic groups and a commitment 
toward their inclusion in the future political process. Although this was on the agenda of 
the Derg, the ‘national question’ did not receive a legitimate answer nor was Abyssinian 
hegemony fully addressed and challenged. Ethnic Federalism also addressed the “central 
hegemony” of the Ethiopian state. Centralization of state rule was now reversed for a 
move toward greater power sharing among the different ethnic states (kilils) to be created 
(Markakis 2011, 229).  
The FDRE constitution in 1995 established the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (Article 1) with the preamble giving the impression of the ‘coming together’ 
rather than ‘holding together’ of nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia (Fisha 2006, 132). 
Power is divided between the federal government and the states. As such, both the state 
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and federal governments shall have legislative, executive and judicial powers (Article 50. 
2).  Furthermore, the Federal Parliament consists of two chambers: The Council of 
People’s Representatives and the Council of the Federation. While the former operates 
under a majoritarian party system elected for 5-year terms (Article 54.1), the latter 
displays a consociational power-sharing structure with one representative per ethnic 
group plus an additional representative for every million people of every ethnic group 
(Article 61.2).  
The FDRE constitution spelt out the division of the Ethiopian state into nine 
federated National Regional states (kilils).  The nine federated states are: Afar, Amhara, 
Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harar, Oromiya, Somali, SNNPRS/the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State, and Tigray (Article 47). Settlement 
patterns, identity and cultural origins, language, consent of the governed, were key 
factors in the delineation of territorial arrangement (Article 39: 5) (Vaughan 2015, 285). 
Moreover, these states proved highly diverse in nature, “asymmetrical on every social 
indicator, with vast differences in population size, demographic distribution and profile, 
developmental indices and resources” (Vaughan 2015, 286). For those with ethnic 
diversity in their states, particularly in the southwest, there have been administrative 
mechanisms established for further accommodation of this diversity (Vaughan 2015, 
286). Furthermore, there were five levels of government for Ethiopia’s brand of 
federalism: federal, regional state, zone, woreda (district) and kebele (local) levels (Keller 
& Smith 2005, 270).  
The constitution states that “All sovereign power resides in the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia” (Article 8). If the federal government abuses the 
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rights of the federated states, “Every nation, nationality and people of Ethiopia shall have 
the unrestricted right to self-determination up to secession” (Article 39). The preservation 
of national unity at the federal level and cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of ethno-
linguistic groups within the ethnic states is negotiated through constitutional language 
policy. While the official language of the Federal government is Amharic, member states 
hold the right to determine their respective official languages (Article 5). The respective 
regional states of Tigray, Oromia and Amhara have adopted their own languages while 
states lacking majority ethnic groups (i.e. Benishangul/Gumuz, Gambella and the 
SNNPRS) have kept Amharic as their working language (Fiseha 2006, 135).        
V. Ethnic Federalism: Assets and Shortcomings  
 
The decentralization of power instituted after 1991 is unique in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with Nigeria being the first African federation on the continent to precede 
Ethiopia’s new ethno-territorial arrangement. Reflecting on the Ethiopian experience, 
many feared that ethnic federalism could lead toward balkanization of the state, similar to 
that of Yugoslavia and “fragmentation of neighboring Somalia” (Vaughan 2015, 286). 
Others praised the new system and saw it as an opportunity to address the historical 
grievances brought by a highly centralized state. Through the establishment of ethnic 
federalism, the Ethiopian government devised a clever way to deal with many ethno-
nationalist struggles and ensured the survival of Ethiopia’s territorial sovereignty. Multi-
ethnic federalism also served as a conflict-mechanism technique, ensuring majority 
ethnic representation within boundaries constituting relatively homogeneous regional 
states (Fiseha 2006, 135). Through its language policy, the constitution also enabled a 
degree of cultural expression and survival, deviating from the homogenization project of 
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previous regimes.  In sum, ethnic federalism challenged the previous nation-state order 
and allowed for greater power sharing in a structure that upheld the rights of previously 
marginalized peoples in Ethiopia.    
 Although the reorganization of the Ethiopian state on the lines of ethnicity 
promised to grant a degree of autonomy and voice to previously dominated groups, there 
are several limitations to ethnic federalism. The first critique of this system is that it 
introduced ethnicity, or its institutionalized form, into Ethiopian politics (Vaughan 2015, 
286). As we have seen in the previous chapters, the use of ethnicity in Ethiopian politics 
predates the modern era. Ethnicity has played a key role both in the process of state-
formation and power-consolidation. However, a problem arises where federal states have 
varying degrees of ethnic homogeneity. In this case, minorities in these regional states 
remain at risk of political and social discrimination. Put differently, “there is always a 
potential for local tyranny” (Fiseha 2006, 136). While the states of Oromia, Tigray, 
Amhara, Afar and Somali are largely homogeneous; the remaining four states are vastly 
heterogeneous. In the latter states with no dominant ethnic majority, the possibility for a 
minority to exercise “tyranny” over the majority is evident (Fiseha 2006, 136-137).   
 Secondly, some boundaries between the states remain vague and thus, difficult to 
delineate territorial demarcations. These have resulted in conflict over water resources 
and land grazing areas. Although these conflicts pre-date the current system, conflict 
between different communities and traditional enmities have been “transformed into 
conflict between adjacent regional states” (Fiseha 2006, 136). Competing contestations to 
the town of Babile by Oromia and the Somali Regional State, access to water and land 
areas by pastoral groups such as the Borana and Gari, and tensions between the Afar and 
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the Issa, from Afar and Somali Regional States respectively, all serve as examples by 
which conflict has been exacerbated through the ethnic federalism system (Fiseha 2006, 
136).  
The EPRDF government faced the challenge of balancing complete 
decentralization and centralization of power. To further reinstate its hegemony, the TPLF 
guided EPRDF government devised and superimposed  “a political system controlled and 
guided from the centre” (Markakis 2015, 242). Again, this was accomplished through the 
merging of party and state as the sole driver of the state-building and development project 
(Markakis 2015, 242).  The decentralization process of ethnic federalism was, from the 
understanding of the periphery, to garner a level of security and control over land and 
resources (Markakis 2011, 260). However, kilils remain powerless in the administration 
of their states. Often, kilil administrators lack trained civil servants to implement and 
regulate policies. This has particularly been the case in the following four regional states: 
the mixed areas of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella to the western border of Sudan and 
the Muslim pastoral Afar and Somali areas to the east (Vaughan 2015, 290). In the past, 
civil servants controlled from the centre governed these areas. As Vaughan notes, 
“Corruption, embezzlement and instability thrived as undereducated and inexperienced 
officials applied the enticing resources attendant on abrupt political promotion to 
communal or clan rivalries” (Vaughan 2015, 290). Land leasing has also resulted in the 
marginalization of pastoralist communities and the maintenance of their way of life, as 
the sparsely populated lowlands would be up for grabs.  
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VI. Economic Priorities and Land Privatization 
 
The strategy that followed for the restoration of the economy focused on the rapid 
growth in agricultural production for domestic consumption and provision of raw 
materials for industrialization. Shifting away from the emphasis of export crop 
production, the main economic initiative of the EPRDF government was to raise 
agricultural productivity for the purposes of food security (Markakis 2011, 257). The 
TPLF reasoned “an economy based on foreign markets...becomes dependent on 
imperialism” (quoted in Lehart 2015, 362). The rhetoric of “independent development” 
“self-reliance” and “national market” thus became dominant discourses to guide internal 
food self-sufficiency (quoted in Lehart 2015, 262).  Agriculture was considered a priority 
for the transformation of the economy and this was based on providing the farmer with 
agricultural inputs (i.e. fertilizers, seeds, etc.) through the “agricultural extension 
package” (Lehart 2015, 363). Although agricultural transformation was regarded as key 
for the domestic economy, it was also seen as “a launching pad for industrialization” 
through the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) program (Lehart 
2015, 363). This program assumed the cycle of growth that would result from the rising 
purchasing power of successful peasants. The demand for food products would then lead 
to the development of new domestic industries, offering greater opportunities for 
employment (Lehart 2015, 363-364).  Yet, the per capita income of Ethiopians reached 
its lowest point since the revolution in the year in 2002 (Prunier 2015, 431).  
The early years of the EPRDF rule were prime times for economic growth; 
however, the failure to fully develop the agricultural economy keep purchasing power at 
minimum; this would in turn inhibit growth elsewhere in Ethiopia (Markakis 2011, 255). 
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With a relatively low success on agricultural returns similar to the last few years 
experienced during the Derg, the regime changed its focus “from the peasant to the land 
itself” (Markakis 2011, 255 & Lehart 2015, 364). Land privatization was most common 
in many parts of Ethiopia in the first decade of the 21st century (Markakis 2011, 257). 
Although it gained momentum in 2009, land was being leased to private capital for 
commercial cultivation in the early 2000s (Markakis 2011, 255).  
There was a political dimension connected to the leasing of local land to foreign 
investors. Most of the leased land areas were in the lowland periphery and put into 
question the regime’s “strategy of development” (Markakis 2011, 255). Particularly, land 
was acquired from Oromo peasants cheaply as they were “allowed to rent half their 
holding; a form of disguised sale” (Markakis 2011, 257). International demands for food 
security and the drive by energy producing countries to invest in crop production for bi-
fuel conversion led to another wave of what some critics called the “second scramble for 
Africa” (Markakis 2011, 260). Although the agri-business led to higher production of 
food, this production was now designed for export purposes, not for local consumption 
(Markakis 2011, 260).  
Moreover, environmental regulations and protection policies that ensure fair trade 
among investors and the public remain minimal (quoted in Lehart 2015, 375). 
Commercial agricultural ventures and focus on FDI, particularly in the lands of the 
periphery, have “reinforced concerns about the autonomy, integrity, and capacity of state 
regulation” under the authority of the regional states (Vaughan 2015, 307). A new 
commodity, chat, has also flourished during this time without any government incentives 
or intervention. Having its roots in the native region of the eastern highlands of Ethiopia, 
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it spread to the Horn area and gained new foreign markets in Europe and North America. 
As noted by Markakis, “Its cultivation spread to all the coffee-producing areas of the 
country, where it competed with Ethiopia’s main export” (Markakis 2011, 259).  
VII. War and Legitimacy  
 
After some years of peace, Ethiopia was engaged in another war with Eritrea. In 
the years after 1991, things were relatively at peace between the two countries. Ethiopia 
supported their independence and a closer tie between Addis Ababa and Asmara was 
established. Signs of disenfranchisement started to develop on economic grounds, as 
Eritrea blamed Ethiopia for its protectionist policies prohibiting Eritreans to work and to 
invest in Ethiopia. In turn, Ethiopia accused Eritrea on the grounds of re-exporting goods 
to Ethiopia imported from abroad (Markakis 2011, 266). After a regional dispute on the 
land claim of Bademe in the northwest border emerged, war was declared between the 
two countries. With the leadership of the United States, a truce was called and both 
countries were obliged to bring their case to international arbitration.  
Given the military advantages Ethiopia had over Eritrea, the war in Eritrea 
brought further division within the TPLF leadership. The division was due to Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi’s decision to retreat from capitalizing on Ethiopia’s battlefield 
gains. General discontent also stemmed from the “overall posture of the government in its 
relationship with foreign donors, which the dissidents condemned as servile” (Markakis 
2011, 273). In March 2001, core members of the TPLF and dissent voices were expelled 
from the Politbureau for an attempt to dispose Prime Minister Meles Zenawi through an 
internal bureaucratic coup (Prunier 2015, 426). Their expulsion further displayed 
increasing autonomy of Meles Zenawi (Markakis 2011, 274).   
	 124	
VII. Conclusion 
 
The TPLF-led EPRDF government established certain ideologies to direct 
Ethiopia’s state-building project. The democratic developmental state brought to light the 
idea of a “revolutionary democracy” and the developmental state had the following three 
tenets: autonomy from the private sector, commitment to development and hegemonic 
hold on the development discourse. All of these led to a fusion of part and state, as 
EPRDF become the sole driver of modernization and development in the country. The 
lack of cooperation with the private sector and centralization of the party/state to avoid 
“rent-seeking” has, to a certain extent, crippled the country's development. The system of 
ethnic federalism, although it dealt with the problems of power centralization and gave 
previously marginalized groups a certain level of agency, still encounters many 
shortcomings. The true nature of power devolution and regional autonomy is still put to 
question today.   
While resisting neoliberal policies in its earlier period, the early 2000s signal a 
policy reform that aligns more fully with a neoliberal paradigm. The privatization of land 
and leasing of land to TPLF supporters and foreign capitalists has marginalized the mass 
peasant population and has cast doubt upon the vision of the “democratic 
developmentalist state.” The internal structure of TPLF was split on the debates over 
relations with Eritrea, further undermining the power and decisions of Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi. Under the current leadership of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn 
Boshe, EPRDF government faces the challenges of managing the delicate dance between 
its party/state protectionist policies and full integration into a liberalized economy under 
the neoliberal order. 
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
I. Key Findings  
 
I identify four sets of findings concerning state building and nation building 
within each of the historical periods explored. First, the predatory theory lends us a 
theoretical framework to understand the state-building process during the leadership of 
Menelik II. The territorial boundary of the Ethiopian state was constructed through the 
interrelated processes of war-making, state-making, extraction/capital accumulation and 
protection. In order to engage in capital accumulation, systems of taxation, the gult land-
tenure system and slave trade were instituted to both strengthen the state-apparatus and 
ensure Abyssinian hegemony. This had both political and cultural ramifications. 
Abyssinian rule resulted in the marginalization of conquered peoples, particularly living 
in the southern periphery. Furthermore, the construction of the Ethiopian nation-state 
legitimized Abyssinian hegemony and developed class structures based on ethnicity. 
Although not explored in great depth, it is critical to note the interlinked development of 
mercantile capitalism and colonialism in the Horn that further precipitated the state-
building project during the reign of Menelik II.     
The second set of findings, associated with the time of Emperor Haile Selassie, 
reveal the contradictions between the modernization project and the keeping of tradition 
in the state-construction process. Building on the legacy of Menelik II, the Emperor 
embarked on a journey to undertake development and to create a more bureaucratic state 
apparatus. The first Ethiopian constitution was drafted in July 1931 and this augmented 
the legibility of the Ethiopian state. Although the provisions of the constitution gave the 
illusion of democratic reform, it was made clear that decision-making power was vested 
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in the Emperor’s sovereignty. Political power was highly centralized in the palace after 
the Emperor’s return from exile. Although the Emperor was committed to some form of 
modernization and development that reformed some institutions and improved Ethiopia’s 
physical infrastructures, the political climate remained monarchic, repressive and 
resistant to accommodate differing political ideologies. 
The ousting of the Emperor and the installment of the Derg regime leads to the 
third set of findings from the research. The Ethiopian Student Movement challenged the 
systems of imperialism and capitalism through a Marxist perspective. Town-bred 
intellectuals placed class struggle at the center while those in the rural and peripheralized 
regions prioritized the national-struggle, thus giving rise to ethno-nationalist movements 
challenging Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. This contradiction, and, thus, the lack of a 
unified political project posed the challenge of garnering full legitimacy and 
consolidating power for the Derg. With its vanguard party established ten years after 
taking power, the Derg embarked on a journey to create a socialist Ethiopia. Some of the 
institutional developments that marked a break from the old, imperial rule were the 
establishment of kebele and peasant associations and the 1975 land reform, which did 
away with the old feudal order of land ownership. However, this vision of socialism did 
not fully materialize as ideological and political opposition was interpreted as a threat to 
the dictatorial rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Thus, under the Derg regime, the state 
largely remained predatory.  
The final set of findings concern the establishment of EPRDF and its political 
ideologies. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the priority became 
building a democratic developmental state. The party made a distinction between “liberal 
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democracy” and “revolutionary democracy.” While the former was deemed the result of a 
fully capitalist market, the latter was based on peasant satisfaction and establishment of a 
secure middle-class. In turn, only one political instrument was deemed necessary to 
capture this peasant interest—the EPRDF ruling party. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
envisioned a developmental state with three critical components: a level of both 
autonomy and interdependence with the private sector; a commitment to development 
and economic growth; and hegemony over developmental discourse. The ‘national 
question’ that remained after the fall of the Derg regime received an answer through the 
ethnic federalism system. The system was intended to both guarantee the territorial 
integrity of Ethiopia and give new spaces for local, civic action. However, there are 
shortcomings to the system that undermine the federalism project and democratic nature 
of EPRDF’s centralized governance.  
II. Key Lessons 
 
 Two main lessons have emerged from my study of Ethiopia’s state-building 
project. The first is the importance of geopolitics or intersocietal relations in the state-
building and nation-building project. By this, I mean both the transfer of ideas from one 
society to another and also the political and economic power that is exerted to influence a 
country’s political and social direction. During the time of Menelik II, the European 
Scramble for Africa and free-trade imperialism played a significant role in the state-
formation process of Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia was never colonized, this external 
process of colonization in the Horn instigated the southern expansion by Abyssinian rule. 
During the time of Haile Selassie, Italian occupation of the region had several impacts on 
state development and the fate of peripheralized ethnic groups. Both the acceptance of 
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Ethiopia into the League of Nations (during the time of Menelik II) and the establishment 
of the OAU (Organization of African Union) garnered attention that further secured the 
international legitimacy of the Ethiopian state. All these early developments were also 
accompanied with the rise and dominance of capitalism as an economic and social 
system. After the removal of the Emperor, global politics shifted and Ethiopia found a 
new friendship with the Soviet Union. Not only were the Soviets crucial in Ethiopia’s 
ideological development of socialism, they also strengthened the Derg’s coercive power 
and power consolidation, particularly in the periphery. The Soviet Union also placed 
significant pressures on the Derg to establish the vanguard party that would lead the 
socialist-state building project. During the time of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the idea 
of the democratic developmental state, based on the experiences of Southeast Asian 
countries, sets the inspirational grounding for a new political project. This political 
project was intended to balance protective and neoliberal policies. With the failure of 
agricultural productivity, the latter has gained momentum starting in the early 2000s.   
 The second lesson derived from this project is the importance of examining the 
movement of history. Within each historical period, we see the state responding—
positively or negatively—to the contradictions of the policy enacted by the previous 
government in power. In other words, the contemporary historical moment always 
inherits the political past and devises new ideologies and institutions that confront these 
contradictions. These new ideas and systems also reveal the ways history is treated as a 
gateway to new possibilities. Furthermore, understanding history is very important as it 
also puts grievances into perspective. In particular, coming to terms with the political 
history of Ethiopia has given me greater insight to the interactions I witnessed among the 
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diaspora. In particular, the interviews I conducted among the Oromo population in the 
Netherlands revealed their own struggle to comprehend the conundrum that is the 
Ethiopian nation-state. Although the system of federalism has been enacted, its 
shortcomings still inhibit one’s full ownership over land and resources, particularly in the 
southern periphery. The culmination of historical events—some which have established 
deep paradigms of Abyssinian political and cultural hegemony—remain as part of the 
contemporary political, social and economic struggle for justice and civic belonging.  
III. Future Inquiries 
 
 There are three future concerns that I derive from my honors project.  The first 
concerns the relationship between capital and forms of labor as it concerns the concept of 
subsumption (process through which capital expands). Real subsumption is when pre-
capitalist state is entirely transformed, having both political institutions and the state-
apparatus oriented toward a capitalist mode of living and production. Situating this in the 
context of Ethiopia, I am interested to evaluate capitalist expansion throughout the 
historical periods explored in my honors. I find this to be a worthy inquiry as the building 
of infrastructure (i.e. railroads) for the transportation of resources in the early era of 
Ethiopian history or the growing influence of multinational corporations in the periphery 
in the modern era signify the changes within the society oriented toward capitalist 
extraction. Understanding capitalist expansion also reveals the deeper dynamics of social 
consciousness rooted in the struggle over material life and the distribution of surplus.  
The second issue arises from EPRDF’s pursuit of a democratic developmental 
state. Although the developmentalist state is concerned with reducing societal 
vulnerability through improving human capital and enhancing productive forces, this also 
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comes at the expense of civic pluralism and basic liberties. The idea of a “revolutionary 
democracy” seeks to address this deficit of a developmentalist state--especially when it 
comes to the rights of the peasant population. Reflecting on the important concepts of 
democracy and the developmental state, I ask: To what extent does human rights become 
sacrificed for economic growth? What are the ramifications of this trade-off? The latter 
question arises from my reflection on Karl Polanyi's concept of “embeddedness.” As an 
economic historian, he argued that economic functions could not be understood apart 
from the larger political, social and cultural world. In other words, economic relations 
have to be understood amongst larger historically evolved institutions. That being said, I 
am curious to evaluate the social and cultural transformations that arise from building a 
developmental state.  
My final curiosity stems from a reflection on the need for reconciliation and 
justice. The rise of monopoly capitalism, which instigated the southern expansionist 
project of Menelik II, has left a costly wound in the country. This wound has manifested 
through ethno-nationalist struggles for liberation and self-determination. The socialist 
agenda brought by the Derg, although it made major attempts in dismantling capitalist 
and imperialist systems of exploitation in the periphery, failed in leading the 
democratization process of the country and tackling the problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment. The EPRDF regime inherited many difficulties accumulated 
throughout Ethiopia’s political past. These challenges, however, are also partly the by-
products of a global political economy bent toward exploitative capitalist gains that 
further exacerbate ethnic tensions. These reflections bring me to the following questions: 
Does the neoliberal paradigm inhibit the process of reconciliation and justice? What 
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agency does the government and the people of Ethiopia have to construct a more just and 
reconciled society? Although I cannot answer these questions right now, I believe the 
quest for answers lies in thoroughly assessing both global and local structures that 
obstruct the making of peace and development.   
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Appendix A: Map of Ethiopia 
 
 
 
Removed for copyright reasons.
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Appendix B: Regional States and Chartered Cities of Ethiopia 
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Appendix C: Shoan Conquest of the Periphery (1887-1890) 
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